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Today, there is no way to ensure that the personnel working within the cockpit of an 
aircraft in flight are authorized to be there.  The primary goal of this thesis is to propose a 
hypothetical design for the use of a non- intrusive mechanism on the flight deck of an aircraft 
to provide continuous or periodic authentication of authorized aircraft personnel.  The 
mechanism should answer questions such as:  “Is the person who is flying the plane actually 
the person who they say they are?” and “Is the correct person in control of the aircraft 
throughout the whole flight segment?”  We will investigate biometrics as a possible security 
mechanism.   
In this thesis, various biometric methods are examined and their application in the 
flight deck is shown.  Studies that have been conducted on real biometric devices are 
examined and their results are reported.  Also examined are the current practices and 
procedures that take place in the flight deck, so that the proposed designs can be understood 
to not interfere with current activities therein.  
Two biometric solutions (i.e. proposed designs) to provide continuous or periodic 
authentication of authorized personnel in the flight deck are introduced.  The proposed 
designs are general and can be used with different types of biometric device(s), and can be 
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As we rush into an increasingly security conscious world, we need ways to pave the 
road ahead. In the area of avionics mechanisms to provide positive identification of 
authorized aircraft personnel onboard all aircrafts are needed. Many current security 
measures have focused on our airports. In contrast, the purpose of this study is to examine 
security measures related to the inner flight deck area of an aircraft.  At this time, there are 
not adequate security measures set forth inside of the flight deck to provide us with 
information such as who is flying the plane, who is inside the flight deck, or even if the 
appropriate persons are in charge of the aircraft for the entire flight.  An authentication 
method is needed to provide this information.  The goal of this thesis is to propose a flight 
deck biometric authentication system designed to provide a positive identification scheme 
and to provide continuous or periodic authentication of authorized aircraft personnel.   
Various biometric techniques suitable for providing continuous or periodic 
authentication currently exist.  This study examines various techniques.  It is not possible to 
cover every biometric technique as limited information has been released about them.  
Furthermore, this study investigates related issues regarding processing time, computing 
power, performance measurements, and methods of protecting the biometric data that would 
be output by a flight deck biometric authentication system.   
Using biometrics in the flight deck of an aircraft is a practical solution because 
biometrics, unlike other forms of identification, personal characteristics provide a positive 
identification scheme, cannot be lost or stolen, and are a part of us.  The last point is what 
makes biometrics so unique in terms of the physical identification schemes we are used to.  
We may provide identification to a security guard at work using our employee ID card but 
that card is not physically a part of us, it is only an object we carry with us.  Biometric 
features are what we are and are always with us.  Biometrics is convenient and always 
available. 
Incorporating a flight deck biometric authentication system in commercial aircraft is 
technically feasible.  There are many products on the market to choose from that are 
relatively easy to use.  Since the cost of biometrics is decreasing, it would be reasonably 
affordable to implement such devices in commercial aircraft.   
 xvi 
Two designs are introduced in this study.  Design #1 takes advantage of the vast 
growth and trustworthiness of networking based on secure communication channels.  Design 
#2 takes advantage of trusted PCs onboard the aircraft and the storage capacities of DVD 
technology.  Distributed enrollment facilities are incorporated into both designs to allow the 
storage of biometric information in reliable decentralized databases.  In addition, distributed 
matching facilities are included in both designs to allocate an external location for biometric 
template matching purposes and DVD backups.  Both designs are expandable to meet the 
evolution of biometric technology and to incorporate the ideas of others.   
Since biometric technology is continuously growing, it will only become better and 
flight deck authentication schemes will also improve.  Neither one of the designs in this study 
are confined to using a specific method of biometrics.  No one method of biometrics is 
preferred over another for use in commercial aircraft in coordination with either flight deck 
biometric authentication system designs proposed here.  It is hoped that this study may serve 
as a baseline for implementing biometric authentication in the flight deck and that it may 






There have been many world events that have directed our attention toward safety 
and security.  In particular, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 have increased our 
attention to security in airports as well as in our aircraft.  Most of the attention to security 
has been obvious; such as improved screening of passengers in airports. Does visible 
security actually aid computer attackers or terrorists who play close attention to the 
development of such security techniques?  Would we feel safer if security were 
transparent to us or would it be an invasion of privacy?  What about implementing 
security with controlled access to sensitive areas, such as the flight deck of an aircraft?  
This study will look at biometrics and its use within the flight deck of an aircraft to 
provide continuous or periodic authentication of authorized personnel while in flight.  
Two designs, for use on the flight deck, are proposed in this study.  
Biometrics refers to the identification of a person based on his or her 
physiological or behavioral characteristics.  Today there are many biometric devices 
based on characteristics that are unique for everyone.  Some of these characteristics 
include, but are not limited to, fingerprints, hand geometry, and voice.  These 
characteristics can be used to positively identify someone. Many biometric devices are 
based on the capture and matching of biometric characteristics in order to produce a 
positive identification.  By employing a biometric device or system of devices inside the 
flight deck, we will be able to tell exactly who is in control of our planes.   
This study begins by reviewing several biometric methods and how they evolved 
into the technologies we now use.  This study goes into greater depth on current 
biometric methods; including the pros and cons of each, how they are used, and 
influences that may affect the results from a biometric device while in use.  A brief 
summary of where biometrics is already implemented is discussed.  Since this study is 
focused on proposing a design for use within the flight deck, current flight deck 
procedures are examined.   
Some people may question the use of biometrics in the flight deck because 
biometrics is a relatively new technology.  This study takes into consideration the 
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possible vulnerabilities that exist in biometric devices or a system of devices.  With every 
new technology there are vulnerabilities that someone, if given a chance, will take 
advantage of.  It is easy to talk about the vulnerabilities and to take advantage of those 
vulnerabilities but if we are aware of them, we may be able to design a system that 
mitigates such weaknesses.  Vulnerabilities for the proposed designs are discussed and 
several ways to alleviate them are suggested. 
Every biometric device or system of devices includes the following three 
processes: enrollment, live presentation, and matching.  The time of enrollment is when 
the user introduces his or her biometric information to the biometric device for the first 
time.  The enrollment data is processed to form the stored biometric template. Later, 
during the live presentation the user’s biometric information is extracted by the biometric 
device and processed to form the live biometric template.  Lastly, the stored biometric 
template and the live biometric template are compared to each other at the time of 
matching to provide the biometric score or result.  Each of these processes is discussed in 
detail including possible faults, which may occur at any time. 
Newer biometric methods are emerging daily and this technology is becoming 
more popular.  In this study, the newest biometric system technique, multi-biometrics or 
multi-modal biometrics is introduced.  This technique takes two or more biometric 
methods and combines them to form a stronger biometric system (in some cases).  There 
are ongoing research projects in this area and this study takes a look at one of these 
studies and describes how such a system can be successfully implemented.  Performance 
is an important factor when considering the implementation of any biometric device. This 
study looks at various performance measurements of biometric devices and explains what 
each measurement means and how it can affect whether the user of the device is accepted 
or rejected.  Some performance measurements are the false acceptance rate and false 
rejection rate.  The false acceptance rate is the rate at which impostors are “falsely” 
accepted by the system whereas the false rejection rate is the rate at which legitimate 
users are “falsely” rejected by the system.     
Careful examination of current biometric studies gives us an insight on how 
certain biometric devices perform and what their error rates are.  This study explores 
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several of these studies; i.e., how they were conducted, the type of subjects used in the 
experiments, and the conclusions.  These studies indicate that advertised performance 
measurements from the manufacturers are not always accurate, due to various laboratory 
or device settings. 
Strong security mechanisms, policies, and procedures need to be defined for 
successful implementation of a biometric device within an aircraft. Several 
recommendations are given for the various devices that may be used in conjunction with 
either one of the proposed designs.  This study does not recommend a particular 
biometric method for use in the flight deck but rather makes suggestions regarding which 
methods may be used and how they can be implemented either by using a single 
biometric device or a multi-modal biometric system.  The two proposed designs are 
intended for general use and may be implemented with any biometric method that exists 
today or in the future.  
 
A.  PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to propose a hypothetical design (or several designs) 
to provide continuous authentication of authorized aircraft personnel as well as guidelines 
for evaluation of biometric technologies for continuous authentication.  This design will 
include, and is not limited to, the technology of biometrics as an authentication tool.  
Also considered is the idea of combining biometrics with another type of authentication 
mechanism such as the use of passwords or smart card technology.  By combining what a 
person knows (e.g. password), what a person has (e.g. smart card), and what a person is 
(e.g. characteristics that are unique to them) there is a better chance that the system as a 
whole will yield the correct answer.  It may be possible though, to only use two of the 
three functions to achieve this goal. 
By providing a mechanism such as biometrics, we will be able to authenticate 
authorized personnel in the aircraft with the most up to date and accurate information 
possible.  This information must be stored in a secure area and should not be vulnerable 
to well known attacks.  Since biometric techniques rely on unique human characteristics, 
it is necessary that this user data be protected. 
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One challenge with biometrics is how and where the user’s template is stored.  
This template contains the user’s personal characteristics and the security of this 
information needs to be stored in a secured database.  The storage of this information 
may also involve privacy issues; these are out of the scope of this study.  If this 
information may be stored in a centralized database, it may become vulnerable to attack 
and compromise.  This study will propose security policies and procedures for protecting 
this vital information.  It is especially important to ensure the privacy of the templates, as 
users will feel more comfortable about having their personal data stored in the system. 
Biometric information must be processed in near real time.  Computing power 
will be a factor in the design. The computing power necessary for particular technologies 
will differ because of the complexity of the algorithms that are used for matching users to 
their templates.  Complex algorithms should not impact processing time. False/Positive 
results are a very important factor in a biometric design.  Little or no error is needed 
when authenticating onboard the aircraft.  Other important aspects that will be taken into 
consideration are the failure to enroll rate1 and the failure to acquire rate2.   
Every biometric system should have general requirements.  The UK Biometrics 
Working Group outlines some general system requirements of all biometric systems [29]. 
These will form a basis for the design considerations in this study.  
 
· The ability to add and delete users. 
 
In order to ensure that only authorized users are using the system, the people who 
are responsible for maintaining the system must be able to add users when necessary (i.e. 
a new employee) and delete users (i.e. a fired employee or one who may have quit the 
job).  If an unauthorized person is able to use the system, that defeats the purpose of this 





                                                 
1 Measures the proportion of individuals for whom the system is unable to generate repeatable 
templates. 
2 Measures the proportion of attempts for which the system is unable to capture or locate an image of 
sufficient quality. 
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· Enrollment of the users 
 
The user may use the biometric device for authentication once they have enrolled 
their digital information into the system.  This digital information will be saved as a 
template (the stored template) that will be compared with the digital image that is 
scanned at the time of verification (live template).  A biometric system can only verify 
that the individual is who he or she claimed to be during enrollment.  With this idea in 
mind, this proposed system must be able to determine if a person has duplicate 
enrollments (i.e. a person may have enrolled into a system as someone else and when that 
legitimate person enrolls, they will have a duplicate enrollment).   
 
· Biometric template, which includes the user’s biometric characteristic that is 
provided to the sensor during both enrollment and live presentation. 
 
This study will look at the accuracy of data collection between all of the biometric 
devices in question.  Data collection is a very important part of the verification and 
authentication process.  The data that is collected must be as accurate as possible.  In 
order for the user to be accepted by the system, their characteristic that is presented to the 
system must be of sufficient quality to the system. 
 
· Transmission of the captured data. 
 
In the proposed designs, once the data is presented to the system and is matched 
with the stored template; it has to be sent to the appropriate personnel for monitoring.  
This is the scenario presented to describe the ideal behavior of the proposed design in this 
study.  The transmission of the captured data must be sent through secure channels and 
cannot be tampered with or modified in any way.  This means that this data cannot be 
vulnerable to common attacks (e.g. man in the middle attack leading to impersonation or 
spoofing of identities).  This study will present analysis of the appropriate 
communication channels for biometric data. 
 
· Matching, where the live biometric template from the user’s current attempt to 
access the system is extracted from the received signal, matched with the stored 
template, and given a “score”. 
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This study will examine the signal processing mechanism and will offer a set of 
criteria, which will allow the system to rate (e.g. as a metric) the information obtained 
from the current attempt to access the system compared with the information of the 
previously stored data in the template (after enrollment has been done).  This rating will 
result in a score based on the comparison mentioned above. 
 
· An authentication policy, which makes the decision to accept or reject the user 
based upon the system’s security criteria and the user’s “score”. 
 
This study will set forth some security criteria that the system must meet.  Along 
with these criteria and the user’s score, as mentioned previously, an authentication policy 
should be followed in order to make a correct decision to accept or reject the user.  If an 
authentication policy does not currently exist, this study will provide a clear-cut basis for 
forming one for the flight deck. 
 
· A system security policy covering audit trail information, quality control, system 
management issues, and level of assurance.  
 
Effective system security policies and procedures are mandatory for a biometric 
authentication system.  Audit trail information should include the time of the event, the 
event type, and the outcome of the event.  System management issues must be taken into 
consideration because the system under consideration must have strong management 
properties. 
At this current time, there are some serious concerns in regards to the security 
measures that take place outside of the flight deck area (i.e. weak flight deck doors). This 
study will explore the security concerns dealing with the inside of the flight deck. It is 
possible that we may choose to use some type of authentication device outside of the 




II.  OVERVIEW OF BIOMETRICS  
One of the biggest challenges facing society today is confirming the true identity 
of a person.  There are several identification verification schemes that exist today but the 
most accurate identification schemes are in the area of biometrics.  Take the simple 
example of an ATM card.  When a person wishes to use their ATM card, they are 
required to enter in a personal identification number (PIN) in order to begin their 
transaction(s). This type of identification verification is given by what that person has 
(their card) and what that person knows (their PIN). There may be a potential problem to 
the ATM scheme given above.  For instance, the card could be stolen for instance.  It 
would be difficult for the thief to be able to use this ATM card unless s/he knew the PIN. 
The PIN is vulnerable to theft especially if someone is looking over your shoulder while 
you are entering your PIN number.  This simple example shows that it is practical to use 
two types of identity verification methods.  Biometrics, alone or used with another type 
of identification verification method, could be an ideal identification verification system 
used onboard an aircraft.   
Some examples of identifying biometric characteristics are fingerprints, hand 
geometry, retina and iris patterns, facial geometry, and signature and voice recognition.  
Biometric identification may be preferred over traditional methods (e.g. passwords, 
smart-cards) because its information is virtually impossible to steal. Although in some 
cases it may become possible to impersonate a biometric (e.g. replicating legitimate 
user’s fingerprints to fool the fingerprint scanning device).   
 
Two interesting properties of biometric identification are: 
 
1. The person to be identified is required to physically be present at the point of 
identification and  
2. Identification based on biometric techniques does not depend on the user to 




There are two distinct functions for biometric devices: 
 
1. To prove you are who you say you are 
2. To prove you are not who you say you are not. 
 
The purpose of the first function is to prevent the use of a single identity by 
multiple people (e.g. a possible attacker or attackers attempting to take over the plane 
cannot pass themselves off as a registered pilot).  In this case it is important that the 
biometric device be able to differentiate between a live biometric presented to the scanner 
(i.e. a real finger) or a spoofed biometric trying to fool the scanner (i.e. a photograph of a 
legitimate user used to fool a facial scanner). The second function is used to prevent the 
use of multiple identities by a single person.  It would have to be ensured that the 
biometric system either automatically cross checks the enrolled characteristics for 
duplicates, or otherwise does not allow a person to register their biometric (i.e. 
fingerprint) under two different names.   
For positive identification, there are also multiple supplemental technologies such 
as passwords, tokens, and cryptographic keys.  An enticing feature of biometric 
identification is that it could take the place of millions of passwords (e.g. long, hard to 
remember passwords used to gain access to sensitive information stored on a computer in 
a large corporation). To provide improved security, biometrics could be used in addition 
to these alternative technologies and would provide us with the information needed to 
achieve continuous authentication. 
 Biometrics has been around for many years.  The French anthropologist, 
Alphonse Bertillon, devised the first widely accepted scientific method of biometric 
identification in 1870.  The Bertillion System, Bertillonage, or anthropometry was not 
based on fingerprinting but rather relied on a systematic combination of physical 
measurements.  These measurements included measurements of the skull width, foot 
length, and the length of the left middle finger combined with hair color, eye color, as 
well as face and profile pictures.  By grouping the data any single person could be placed 
into one of 243 distinct categories.  For the next thirty years, Bertillonage was the 
primary method of biometric identification [3]. Another example of biometrics in practice 
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was a form of finger printing being used in China in the 14th century, as reported by 
explorer Joao de Barros. He wrote that the Chinese merchants were stamping children’s 
palm prints and footprints on paper with ink to distinguish the young children from one 
another [3]. 
Fingerprints are unique to each individual and each individual has their own 
pattern in their fingerprints.  This type of identification has been successfully used by the 
police to capture criminals and to find missing children.  A fingerprint records the 
patterns found on a fingertip.  There are a variety of approaches to fingerprint 
verification.  The traditional method, which is used by police, matches minutiae (details 
of the fingerprint).  Some other approaches are pattern matching, and moiré fringe 3 
patterns [3].  There are some verification approaches that can detect if a live finger is 
presented, but not all of these approaches can provide this type of information.  If 
fingerprint-scanning techniques were to be incorporated into the flight deck to provide 
continuous authentication, liveness detection or testing would be a requirement for the 
system. 
Fingerprints serve to reveal an individual’s true identity and the practice of using 
fingerprints as a means of identification has been a helpful aid to those who chose to use 
this type of identification.  Fingerprints are unique in the sense that there has not been 
any type of pattern duplication by two different people.  Not even a single instance has 
been identified or discovered at this time.  This uniqueness also applies to identical twins, 
as well as triplets, quadruplets, and quintuplets.  One good thing about fingerprints is that 
any type of burn (superficial), abrasions, or cuts do not affect the ridge structure, thus the 
fingerprint pattern is unaffected.   
Hand geometry involves analyzing and measuring the shape of the hand.  This 
type of biometric offers a good balance of performance characteristics and is relatively 
easy to use.  The ease of integration into other systems and processes, coupled with ease 
of use, makes hand geometry an obvious first step for many biometric projects.  Unlike 
fingerprints, the human hand isn’t unique.  It is also known that one could change the 
geometry of their hands by taking a hammer and smashing it.  One drawback for this type 
of identification is that individual hand features are not descriptive enough for 
                                                 
3 Moiré fringe is a method used to determine 3D profile information of an object or scene, using 
interference of light stripes and ultrasonics. 
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identification.  Hand geometry is the granddaddy of the modern biometrics by virtue of a 
20-year history of live applications. There have been six different hand-scanning products 
developed over this span, including some of the most commercially successful biometrics 
to date [11].  Hand geometry biometric is by far less accurate than other biometric 
methods.  
As an extension to hand geometry analysis, a recent creation by LiveGrip™ 
analyzes the veins, arteries and fatty tissues of the hand. Sixteen scans are taken and a 
template of the individual’s hand is stored [11]. This method of identification could be 
costly in terms of storage of templates because sixteen scans are taken, but at the same 
time, this method does analysis of distinct characteristics of an individual that cannot be 
changed (i.e. vein geometry, arteries, and fatty tissues of the hand).  San Francisco 
International Airport, the USA’s fifth largest airport, has been using hand geometry-
based systems to authenticate airport employees for almost 10 years [11]. The U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons uses hand geometry to track movements of its prisoners, staff 
and visitors within prisons. Once a person enters the system, they must have their hand 
scanned. The information is entered into a database and the individual is issued a 
magnetic swipe card that they carry at all times [11]; this is a good example of keeping 
track of someone, but one question arises; does this system offer some type of continuous 
authentication since it is actually tracking an individual?  Are they sure that they are 
tracking the correct person? 
A retina-based biometric involves analyzing the layer of blood vessels situated at 
the back of the eye.  This technique uses a low-intensity light source through an optical 
coupler to scan the unique patterns of the retina.  Retinal scanning can be quite accurate 
but does require the user to look into a receptacle and focus on a given point [21]. This 
technique may pose a problem if the subject wears glasses or if the subject is concerned 
with having close contact with the retinal reading device.  It is also unknown what types 
of results are presented in a situation when the user has an eye disease such as cataracts.  
This technology itself can work well although all users do not accept it.   
Retina scan is actually one of the oldest biometrics as 1930’s research suggested 
that the patterns of blood vessels on the back of the human eye were unique to each 
individual. However, technology has taken more time than the theory to be usable.  
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EyeDentify, developed the Eyedentification 7.5 personal identification unit, the first 
retina scan device made for commercial use, in 1984. At this time, they are still the 
primary company for retinal scan devices though they do use resellers [22]. 
An iris-based biometric involves analyzing features found in the colored ring of 
tissue that surrounds the pupil.  This biometric has the potential for higher than average 
template-matching performance [21]. Ease of use and system integration has not 
traditionally been strong points with iris scanning devices but as new products emerge, 
improvements should be expected.  The idea of using iris patterns for personal 
identification was originally proposed in 1936 by ophthalmologist Frank Burch. By the 
1980’s the idea had appeared in James Bond films, but it still remained science fiction 
and conjecture. In 1987 two other ophthalmologists, Aran Safir and Leonard Flom, 
patented this idea, and in 1989 they asked John Daugman (then teaching at Harvard 
University) to try to create actual algorithms for iris recognition. These algorithms, which 
Daugman patented in 1994 and are owned by Iridian Technologies, are the basis for all 
current iris recognition systems and products [21].   
In 1999, EyeTicket Corporation4 introduced JetStream™ for passenger processing 
including airline check-in and boarding, passport and visa control, as well as EyePass™ 
for airport and airline employee access control to secure areas.  EyeTicket’s JetStream 
and EyePass programs operating at Charlotte Douglas International airport, USA, at 
Heathrow airport, UK, and elsewhere have accumulated in excess of 400,000 transactions 
with 100% accuracy, no false identifications, and no security breaches. 
Facial recognition analyzes facial characteristics such as overall facial structure, 
which includes the distance between the eyes, nose, mouth, and jaw edges.    This works 
in conjunction with a digital video camera that captures the image of the face.  This 
biometric has been widely, and perhaps wildly, touted as a fantastic system for 
recognizing potential threats (whether terrorist, scam artist, or known criminal) but so far 
has been unproven in high- level usage. It is currently used in verification only systems 
with a good deal of success.  The development stage for facial recognition began in the 
late 1980s and commercially available systems were made available in the 1990s. While 
                                                 
4 The leading developer and provider of iris recognition-based travel management systems. 
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many people first heard about facial recognition after September 11th, 2001, football fans 
were introduced to it at the Super Bowl several months earlier [21].   
Biometric signature verification goes beyond visual signature comparison in its 
analysis of the way a user signs his/her name.  Signing features such as speed, velocity, 
and pressure are as important as the finished signature static shape.  Signature verification 
devices are reasonably accurate in operation and obviously lend themselves to 
applications where a signature is an accepted identifier.  Every person has a unique 
signature but that signature is still vulnerable to duplication.  If one person tries to 
“forge” a signature, they will study their victim’s signature and practice that style of 
writing.  However, since speed, velocity, and pressure play a role in signature 
verification, an attacker would need to know these characteristics prior to attempting to 
forge a biometric signature. 
About 10+ years ago, computers were mainly used for accounting needs.  Today, 
computer use is expanding to every corner of the world.  Until now, the computer 
infrastructure was simply not ready for biometrics or signature verification.  Digital 
signature verification is relatively new and has begun its history within the last 1-2 years.  
In the past, simply looking at two or more samples of a person’s signature to see if they 
matched was signature verification.  By performing digital signature verification, 
matching is done by comparing the movement of how one signs his/her name as 
mentioned above. 
Voice authentication allows the user to use his/her voice as an input device to the 
system.  Voice commands to computers began with applications that were trained by the 
user to recognize certain words that were spoken such that the user could, for example, 
speak to a word processor instead of actually typing the words out.  Poor quality and 
ambient noise can affect verification.  Certain voice-scan technologies are resistant to 
imposter attacks to a lesser degree than finger scan systems. 
Biometrics has long been used as a form of identification beginning with the early 
use of fingerprints as described at the beginning of this section.  As technology becomes 
more robust, we will be able to use devices that are more accurate when using biometrics 
as a form of identification.  More recent forms of biometric authentication include facial 
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recognition and iris/retina scanning.  Current research is being conducted in the subject of 
biometric assurance (confidence that a biometric device can achieve the intended level of 
security).   
When deciding on a biometric device for use in an aircraft, we want to include the 
best level of security possible, within the physical and operational limits inherent to the 
environment and we want to be very confident that the device will give us the intended 
level of security as well as accuracy and near real time results.  Current metrics for 
comparing biometric technologies, such as the crossover error rate5 and the average 
enrollment time6, are limited because they lack a standard test bed on which to base their 
values.  Several groups, including the US Department of Defense’s Biometrics 
Management Office, are developing standard testing methodologies [21].   
Along with the positive aspects of biometrics as the technology of choice for 
individual identification and to catch false identification attempts, each method described 
above also has its own drawbacks.  There are various situations that must be taken into 
consideration when deciding on a feasible method for continuous authentication of 
authorized aircraft personnel.  It is surprising to see that some of these biometric methods 
have been used for some time now and the immense growth of technology has made it 
possible to improve upon these methods.   
There are a few security measures concerning airplane flight decks that are being 
requested by pilots to the FAA currently [28]: 
 
1. Replace flight deck doors and walls on all aircraft with strong panels lined with 
bulletproof Kevlar material. 
 
2. Install video cameras outside flight deck doors, and monitors inside the flight 
deck, so pilots can see what’s going on back in the cabin without opening the 
door. 
 
3.  Take flight deck keys away from flight attendants, so hijackers can’t wrest 
control of them and gain entry to the flight deck. 
 
                                                 
5 Generally stated as a percentage, at which the false rejection rate and the false acceptance rate are 
equal. 
6 Defined as the time in which a biometric feature is saved as a pers onal reference either de-centrally 
on a chip card or PC, or centrally in a data base 
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4. Allow pilots to carry guns that fire rubber bullets, or a subsonic, frangible round, 
that would not puncture the aircraft’s outer shell during pressurized flight. 
 
5. Change flight-crew training so that pilots are discouraged, even prohibited, from 




Of these proposed security measures intended for the flight deck of the plane, 
there is no mention of biometrics or anything intended for the inner flight deck area.  
These security measures are far more concerned with the exterior of the flight deck, while 
this particular study is concerned with the inner flight deck, behind the reinforced doors 
where control of the aircraft takes place.  The security measure requests mentioned above 
all have good reason behind them but as with any type of security measure, they all are 
vulnerable to some type of penetration or attack.  Because these precautions are 
vulnerable, it is practical to say that if there were also some type of security measures 
mandated specifically for the interior of the flight deck in addition to the concerns with 
the exterior of the flight deck, this would make it even more difficult for an attacker to 
“take over the plane”.  This security measure inside of the flight deck could be achieved 
by implementing a biometric device, possibly along with an additional authentication 
device to achieve continuous authentication. 
Biometric technology has been put in place in some markets at this present time 
and this technology looks very promising.  Some vertical markets using biometrics 
include [16]: 
 
1. Government – driver’s licenses, voter cards, etc; 
2. Transportation – airport security, boarding passes; 
3. Healthcare – patient/employee identity cards; 
4. Financial – ATM cards, credit cards (which contain a photo of the holder) 
5. Security – personnel access control and identity verifications (which includes time 
and attendance); 
6. Public justice and safety – prison ID’s 
7. Education – student/teacher identity verification and access control.  
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Most of us are familiar with or have used many of the types of identification 
methods mentioned above.  These are examples of the simplest types of identification 
methods that we use everyday (driver’s license, employee identity cards).   Biometrics is 
not a new concept, we all have been subject to it in some way or another and some of us 
actually prefer to provide identification via biometrics.  Others may have security 
concerns when it comes to storing their biological trait information in a central database 
somewhere or even allowing that information to be contained in a little chip on an ID or 
credit card.  Designers of biometric systems must keep in mind that personal biological 
trait information is sensitive and must be safeguarded with the appropriate security 
mechanisms.   
If biometric technology were to be brought into the flight deck of a plane, there 
would be a better sense of security surrounding all of those who use the device (s).  It is 
difficult to estimate the cost of an impending threat so we want to be able to thwart the 
threat before it becomes reality. Vulnerabilities should be defined and alleviated prior to 
implementation. 
Continuous authentication takes biometrics one step further.  Of all of the 
biometric technologies that are in current use, none of them mention the term “continuous 
authentication”, the authentication process is a one-time event (i.e. placing your palm on 
a palm reader so that you are allowed to enter a certain area of a building).  One major 
break-through in the world of biometric technology would be to offer a mechanism that 
would provide continuous authentication for a given amount of time needed (i.e. the 
duration of a flight).   
 
A. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BIOMETRIC 
TECHNIQUES 
 
No biometric solution will be 100% secure, but when compared to a PIN or a 
password, biometrics may offer a greater level of security.  Biometrics in general holds a 







Positive Identification Public Acceptance 
You can’t lose, forget, or share your 
biometric information. 
Legal Issues 
A biometric template is unique to the 
individual for whom it is created 
Possible increase in hardware costs to 
current systems. 
Rapid identification/authentication May require large amounts of storage 
Costs, in general, are decreasing Privacy Concerns 
 
Table 1.   General Advantages/Disadvantages of Biometrics 
 
The advantages outweigh the disadvantages primarily because of the first point, 
biometrics provides positive identification.  The ultimate goal is to be able to obtain 
positive identification without having any doubts.  Since one can’t lose, forget, or share 
their biometric information, then it is known positively that the valuable information 
cannot be falsified.  Although it is very difficult to falsify a biometric trait of an 
authorized user, biometrics (e.g. a face or fingerprint) are not necessarily kept a secret.  
For example, our fingerprints are left in a wide variety of places in a given day such as at 
our homes and in the office (our fingerprints are all over our computer keyboards, mice, 
and coffee mugs).  
Once a person has their biological traits put into a template for later 
identification/verification, it is known that the template is unique to that one individual.  
Depending on the biometric method that is implemented, identification / authentication 
can take place in a matter of seconds or microseconds.  This time also depends on the 
type of system that the administrator is using.  Although the idea of digital identification 
is fairly new, there is a great deal of competition today with similar products, which 
drives these companies to lower the cost in general. 
Public acceptance is the most important issue when implementing a new system 
or methods by which one abides.  If the public does not accept the notion of biometrics, it 
would be difficult to implement successfully because it would not be used.  There is a 
long list of legal issues that biometrics imposes.  Legal issues are out of scope for this 
study. 
Integrating a biometric system into an environment where authentication is 
necessary is easy if brand new systems were integrated to just do that (i.e. implementing 
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only fingerprint scanners in the flight deck).  There may also be existing systems that the 
integrator may want to upgrade.  Hardware costs will definitely increase and that may 
become a drawback for an agency or enterprise to use biometrics as a means for 
identification / authentication.  The cost of new technology will always become an issue. 
Storage allocation of biometric templates will also increase and may pose a problem with 
those who may not comprise sufficient amount of storage at the current time.  
Table 2 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of various current 
biometric techniques on an individual basis. 
 
 
Technology Advantages Disadvantages 
Fingerprint scanning -Inexpensive 
-Very secure 
-Physical contact to a 
general scanning device 
may spread germs. 
Hand geometry scanning -May lead to a better 
technology (measurements 
of the vein structure in a 
hand) 
-Not as unique as 
fingerprints 
Retina-based scanning -Accuracy is assured since 
the retina remains relatively 
stable throughout a lifetime. 
-May not be generally 
accepted since the user 
must come into close 
contact with the scanning 
device. 
Iris-based scanning -Very difficult to fool 
 
-Expensive 
Facial recognition -Process can be invisible  -Expensive 
-Accuracy 
Voice authentication -Widely known to work 
well over the telephone 
-Low Cost 
-May be able to measure 
stress. 
-Background noise or 
sickness (soar throat) may 
cause interference 
-Voice can be easily 
changed. 
Signature verification -Widely accepted -Accuracy is difficult to 
ensure 
Table 2.   Advantages and Disadvantages of various biometric techniques 
  
As Table 2 indicates, the advantages of fingerprint scanning clearly outweigh the 
disadvantages.  Fingerprint scanning offers a very secure means of identification in an 
inexpensive way.  The only disadvantage is that there is contact with a general scanning 
device that may spread germs.  Simply offering antibacterial cleansing solution before 
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and after the individual scans his/her finger may alleviate this problem.  One may also 
stereotype fingerprinting as a means of identifying criminals although the type of 
fingerprinting done here is by digital means (e.g. a scanning device rather than traditional 
ink and paper).  Although hand geometry scanning is not as unique as fingerprints, this 
technology may impose a better means of identification such as vein structure, which is 
just as unique as a fingerprint. Both retina and iris based scanning techniques are very 
accurate and difficult to fool.  Since the retina remains relatively constant during a 
lifetime, accuracy can be accomplished with little thought about environmental factors.  
Retina scanning is considered an exceptionally accurate and invulnerable biometric 
technology and is established as an effective solution for very high security 
environments. Retina scanning may not be widely accepted because the individual has to 
come into close contact with the scanning device and some people may feel 
uncomfortable with having a laser scanning right at their eyes. 
Individuals are familiar with signature and voice verification methods as a means 
of identification verification on a daily basis.  The accuracy of signature verification 
cannot be ensured.  A signature may change depending of various factors such as 
arthritis, temperature of the hand, or stress levels.  This is the same for voice 
authentication because any type of background noise or sickness (e.g. soar throat) may 
affect accuracy.  Both of these methods are widely accepted but do not provide the type 
of security necessary in the flight deck of a plane.  This premature assumption does not 
state that voice and signature verification methods cannot be used in conjunction with 
other methods to provide continuous authentication in the flight deck.   
Security, especially in airports, is a major and important issue since September 11 
and there has been an interest in integrating biometric technology in airports as well as 
inside of the flight deck since then.  Biometrics will not serve as a replacement 
technology, but it will serve as an enhancement. Layered with existing access control 







B.  BIOMETRIC DEVICES: PROPERTIES OF BIOMETRICS 
The automatic capturing (i.e. enrollment or authentication) of biometric sample 
data and comparison (i.e. matching) with previously stored characteristic or normative 
data requires the following properties of biometric characteristics: 
· Invariance: The biometric characteristic should be constant over a long 
period of time.  This would eliminate the need for constant updating of the 
templates that are stored in the system.  For example, the iris is constant 
throughout a person’s lifetime as compared to facial characteristics (which 
may change due to aging). 
· Measurability and Timeliness: The personal characteristic must be able to 
be automatically compared to an expected norm.  The biometric sample 
should be suitable for capture without waiting time, which is important for 
continuous authentication and other complications because we want to use 
a technique which will provide near real- time identification.  The flight 
deck biometric authentication system needs to be able to capture the 
biometric information from the legitimate user with decreased system 
result waiting time.   
· Singularity: The biometric characteristic should have sufficient unique 
properties in order to distinguish one person from any other.  This is true 
for all biometric characteristics. 
· Reducibility: The captured data should be capable of being reduced to a 
size that is easy to handle but impossible to duplicate.  This property is 
important especially when we are dealing with communicating the 
biometric data across secure channels (i.e. from the authenticating device 
to the controller of the results which may be in a remote area). 
· Reliability: The biometric technique should ensure high reliability and 
integrity.  The flight deck biometric authentication system needs to be 
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reliable because it would be costly to have a system that does not provide 
consistent results.   
· Privacy: The biometric technique should ensure the privacy of the person 
using the system so that they are convinced that their privacy is not being 
violated in any way.   
All of these properties are important to all biometric characteristics (e.g. iris, 
retina, fingerprint, and facial characteristics) because we want to be able to provide an 
accurate way of authenticating authorized personnel in the flight deck. 
 
C.  INTRODUCTION TO FACIAL RECOGNITION 
Facial recognition systems analyze facial characteristics.  This system requires a 
digital camera or a camcorder to develop a facial image of the user for identification.  
The facial recognition technique is one of the fastest growing areas in biometric 
technologies [11].  Facial recognition software measures characteristics such as the 
distance between facial features, for example, from pupil to pupil, or the dimensions of 
the features themselves such as the width of the mouth.  Some of these devices also 
perform a “liveness” test to see how your face moves, so that a photo of the user cannot 
be used [11].  This “liveness” test would be a necessity essential for determining flight 
deck status. 
Facial recognition may be generally accepted by users since it uses a digital 
camera and we are somewhat accustomed to taking photographs or being in a 
photographic situation (i.e. taking a picture for an ID card or a driver’s license).  People 
are used to identifying others by their facial features (i.e. such as viewing a photograph).  
 For any biometric system there has to be some user knowledge of the device in 
the first place.  If the user does not know how to use the device, for example, that may 
lead to higher rejection rates by the system.  If the user is comfortable with the system 
and has been trained to properly use it, then the acceptance rates as well as user- to-
system compatibility will increase.   
In the case of facial recognition, it is possible to transparently capture facial 
images of individuals and compare those images to a database of known criminals, for 
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example.  There is a concern regarding transparent capturing of facial images of innocent 
individuals, mainly due to the fact that they are not aware, or haven’t agreed to be part of 
the “virtual criminal lineup”.  Privacy issues related to this type of situation will not be 
addressed in this study. 
 
1.  How Facial Recognition Works 
There are about 80 nodal points on a human face.  Some nodal points that are 
measured by facial recognition software are the following: 
· Width of nose 
· Depth of eye sockets 
· Width of cheekbones 
· Jaw line 
· Chin 
These nodal points are measured to create a numerical code that represents the 
face in a database [4].  Facial recognition methods may vary, but they generally involve a 
series of steps that serve to capture, analyze, and compare your face to a database of 
stored templates.  There are several facial recognition tools currently out in the market, 
one such example is called the FaceIT® system7.  Listed below is the basic process that is 
used by this system to capture and compare facial images [4]: 
· Detection: When the system is attached to a video surveillance system, the 
recognition software searches the field of view of a video camera for 
faces.  If there is a face in the view, it is detected within a fraction of a 
second.  In the case of identification in the flight deck of a plane, for 
example, the camera would be positioned where there would generally be 
a face in full view. 
                                                 
7 http://www.wei-usa.com/FaceIt.htm 
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· Alignment:  Once a face is detected, the system determines the heads 
position, size, and pose.  A face needs to be turned at least 35 degrees 
toward the camera for the system to be able to register it. 
· Normalization: The image of the head is scaled and rotated so that it can 
be registered and mapped into an appropriate size and pose. 
· Representation: The system translates the facial data into a unique code. 
· Matching: the newly acquired facial data is compared to the stored data 
and (ideally) linked to at least one stored facial representation. 
Raw data, such as an actual photograph, of users’ faces is not stored in the system.  
Instead, the software stores the images as unique codes that only the computer can 
comprehend.  Because unique codes are stored in the system, it is difficult for an attacker 
to spoof the biometric information.  Also, an attacker would not have the ability to extract 
an actual photograph of the legitimate users of the system.  The attacker would only be 
able to extract numerical codes.   
 The heart of the FaceIt® facial recognition system is the Local Feature Analysis 
(LFA) algorithm. This is the mathematical technique the system uses to encode faces. 
The system maps the face and creates a faceprint, a unique numerical code for that face. 
Once the system has stored a faceprint, it can compare it to the thousands or millions of 
faceprints stored in a database. The system can match multiple faceprints at a rate of 60 
million per minute from memory or 15 million per minute from hard disk. As 
comparisons are made, the system assigns a value to the comparison using a scale of one 
to 10. If a score is above a predetermined threshold, a match is declared.  
  
2.  Facial Recognition: User Influences 
Every person carries unique characteristics in their facial features.  Factors such 
as the distance between the eyes and the shape of the nose play an important role in 
distinguishing a person digitally.  The one factor that separates facial recognition from 
other biometric technologies is the fact that the face is a changeable surface, displaying a 
23 
variety of expressions, as well as being an active 3D object whose image varies with 
viewing angle, pose, illumination, accoutrements, and age [29]. 
It has been shown that for facial images taken at least one year apart; even the 
best current algorithms have error rates of 43% - 50% [29].  This error rate range would 
not be acceptable if it were employed in the flight deck for continuous authentication.  
The fact that this error rate range corresponds to a one-time authentication step, it is quite 
possible that this rate may fall well below 10% when it is applied to continuous 
authentication.  It is also possible that there may even be a better algorithm for use in this 
situation. 
When considering facial recognition as a form of identification, there are some 
user-based influences that must be taken into consideration. Some user-based influences 
are [29]: 
· Beards or moustaches 
· Baldness 
· Height  
· Skin tone 
Beards and moustaches play a major role in acceptance rates.  It is possible that an 
appearance or disappearance of facial hair may have an effect on rejection rates for the 
male population.  The same argument can be made about the influence of baldness.  A 
slowly receding hairline may cause rejection by the system, if in fact; the forehead size is 
a part of the user template.  For example, a receding hairline may cause the forehead to 
appear larger and that person may have to re-enroll their information into the system once 
again and the same would be true for a man who usually wears a beard or moustache and 
decides to shave it off completely.   
The height of a person may also play a crucial role because the very tall, very 
short or those in wheelchairs may have difficulty positioning themselves correctly [29].  I 
feel that the height factor will have little effect in the flight deck of a plane because 
authorized personnel are usually seated during flight. 
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Skin tone may also affect whether the user is accepted or rejected by the system 
as well.  For example, there may be a person whose skin pigment does not register very 
well with the system and are forced to rejection most of the time.  The system should be 
able to adapt to different skin tones and lighting situations. 
The users’ behavior may also have an influence on the systems acceptance or 
rejection rates.  Some user behavioral activities that may affect the outcome from the 
system are [29]: 
· Facial expression 
· Movement or lack of movement 
· Head position 
· Distance from camera 
Facial expressions can indeed affect the system outcome.  For example, if a user 
initially enrolled into the system with a serious look, they should identify themselves to 
the camera the same way every time (if at all possible).  One should not do things such as 
widening/squinting the eyes or wrinkling up their nose because it is likely that this type 
of activity will cause a rejection from the system. 
Movement or lack of movement may also cause a rejection from the biometric 
system.  If the user is moving too much, an accurate result may not be possible.  The 
same holds true if the user has lack of movement or if the user has their head tilted to one 
side.  Usually the normalization algorithm used for facial recognition would adjust for 
activities such as these.  Lack of movement may also imply that an intruder is showing a 
photograph of the legitimate user to the facial scanning device.  For this reason, it is 
important that the system is capable of performing “liveness” tests.   
In the process of facial recognition, the user may be required to stand or sit a 
certain distance from the camera in order to achieve desired results.  If the user is 
standing or sitting too far or too close to the camera, then the results may be inaccurate 
 and cause a rejection from the system. 
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User appearance is another issue that must be taken into consideration.  Some user 
appearance factors are [29]: 
· Clothing 
· Cosmetics and Cosmetic surgery 
· Glasses or sunglasses 
· Hairstyle or hair color 
Some clothing influences may be ha ts, earrings, or scarves.  Cosmetics whether it 
is caused by user application or surgical procedure may have an effect on acceptance or 
rejection from the system.  Glasses or sunglasses may also affect the result from the 
system.  It is suggested that if the user initially used glasses while enrolling in the system 
then they must always use those glasses when identifying themselves to the device. 
Hairstyles and/or hair color may also affect the users’ acceptance or rejection rate.  
Since hairstyles probably change faster than hair color, it is suggested that the system 
adapt to these changes or to completely ignore these changes and pay attention to other 
important attributes of the face.  It would become very costly if the users had to re-enroll 
themselves every time they made a change to their appearance. 
In order to be able to implement an effective system, the user influences described 
here must be taken into consideration.  If this type of system is implemented in the flight 
deck of a plane, some of these influences may be disregarded.   
 
3.  Facial Recognition: Environmental Influences 
In addition to user influences, there are also some environmental influences that 
must be considered.  Environmental influences are based on general background, 
lighting, and weather conditions.  These influences are [29]: 
· Background, clutter 
· Other faces 
· Lighting or reflections 
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· Rain or snow 
Background scenery or clutter around the camera may cause problems when a 
user is trying to authenticate to the system.  If there are other faces that are obstructing or 
confusing the camera or a faint reflection of another face in the background will have an 
effect on the acceptance or rejection rates of the system. Lighting and weather conditions 
such as rain or snow (causing redness in the face) also have an effect on system outcome.  
By identifying these environmental influences there is a better understanding of what we 
need to pay attention to if facial recognition is integrated into the proposed designs of this 
study.   
Data quality is the key to achieving satisfactory operational performance of the 
biometric system.  The environment under which enrollment or authentication is taking 
place will affect the quality of the enrollment or authentication/identification function 
performed by the system.  Since this system will be used by a limited number of people 
(i.e. rather than by millions of patrons in the airport) it is easier to define the environment 
that the device will be used in and it makes it easier to determine whether the device is 
being used the way that it is meant to be used.   
 
4.  Methods of Facial Recognition 
 
 The four primary methods employed by facial scan vendors to identify and verify 
subjects include eigenfaces, feature analysis, neural network, and automatic face 
processing. Some types of facial scan technology are more suitable than others for 
applications such as forensics, network access, and surveillance.  The process flow of 
facial scan technology, as with other biometric techniques, contains 4 steps [17, 31]: 
· Sample Capture 
· Feature Extraction and storage 
· Live and stored template comparison prior to matching 
· Matching of the live and stored templates to produce a matching score 
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A system that is based on using local feature analysis uses a camera and computer 
to identify a person and analyzes pixels that make up the face image. 
A flight deck biometric authentication system using facial recognition should be 
capable of performing liveness tests and a system based on local feature analysis will be 
able to perform liveness tests.  In order to be sure that the eyes, nose, and mouth belong 
to a living being and not a mannequin, the program looks for eye blinks or other tell tale 
facial movements [1].   
The Eigenface method examines the face as a whole and is one of the most 
popular face recognition methods in use today [31].  With a database of headshots on 
hand, the system compares the face being identified to the composite.  The composite is 
the actual template of the image that is initially stored in the system at the time of 
enrollment and the target is the live template that is captured at the time of authentication.  
An algorithm measures how much the target face differs from the composite and 
generates a 128-digit personal identification number based on the deviation. If the 
Eigenface method is used, a training set that contains enough number of face examples is 
needed.  The purpose of the training set is to have a number of various templates of the 
same person.  These various templates are expected to cover various conditions such as 
different head poses, lighting conditions, or facial expressions [31].   
Though overall not as robust as eigenfaces, feature analysis, or neural network, 
automatic face processing may be more effective in dimly lit, frontal image capture 
situations [31].  In neural network mapping, the enrollment and verification data are 
compared and there is a vote on whether there is a match between the two.  Neural 
networks employ an algorithm to determine the similarity of the unique global features of 
live verses enrolled faces.  This method, theoretically, leads to an increased ability to 
identify faces in difficult conditions [31].    
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D.  INTRODUCTION TO IRIS RECOGNITION 
 
An iris-based biometric identification scheme involves analyzing features that are 
found in the colored ring of tissue that surrounds the pupil.  Complex iris patterns can 
contain many distinctive features such as ridges, crypts, rings, and freckles [7].  Iris 
scanning uses a fairly conventional camera and requires no close contact between the 
subject and the reader.  Compared to the close contact between the subject and the reader 
required by some other biometric identification systems such as retina scanning, the 
subject may feel more comfortable using this type of device.  The iris is unique from 
person to person because there are so many different patterns that surround the pupil.  
The iris is said to be more unique than a fingerprint.  It is possible that the iris-scanning 
device can successfully read the patterns in the iris even when the subject has a pair of 
glasses on and this idea has been demonstrated to work in an actual system [31].  This 
recognition ability would be valuable in the flight deck of an aircraft because it is not 
known whether the person being authenticated is wearing glasses or not.   
 
1.  How Iris Recognition Works 
 
The iris-scanning procedure is simple and painless.  All the subject needs to do is 
to stand at least a foot away from the camera and look into the scanning device.  The 
camera then scans the iris into a pattern that is digitized [11].  The scanned digitized 
pattern is then compared to a previously recorded pattern.  These stored patterns are also 
called templates, the same idea that is used with other biometric techniques such as 
fingerprint scanning and facial recognition. 
The iris is protected from the environment and is stable over time.  The iris would 
be difficult to duplicate, in order to spoof an authorized user in the system; an attacker 
would actually need the authorized user’s eyeball, which is highly unlikely to happen 
under normal circumstances.  Furthermore, if the flight deck biometric authentication 
system consisted of an iris recognition system, liveness testing is possible.  The iris-scan 
systems test for a live eye by checking for the normal continuous fluctuation in pupil size 
[30]. 
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In order to capture the rich details of iris patterns, an imaging system should 
resolve a minimum of 70 pixels in iris radius.  In field trials to date, a resolved iris radius 
of 100 to 140 pixels is more typical [30, 31].  There are many advanced algorithms that 
are used to aid the scanning device in actually locating the iris by distinguishing it from 
the pupil.  
Iris recognition technology converts the visible characteristics of the iris into a 
512-byte code, which is a template stored for future verification attempts.  Iris-scan 
technology is primarily deployed in high-security physical access implementations [31], 
which makes it an ideal candidate to employ in the flight deck. Iris scanning is more 
accurate than that of fingerprint scanning [30, 31].  Since the user may have to look at the 
camera for iris scanning for up to 15 seconds, it is not known if this technology can be 
performed continuously, but it may be performed periodically.  Periodic scanning of the 
iris may be sufficient to achieve close to continuous authentication. 
Since iris-scanning technologies are harmless to the eye, there should be no 
concerns about long-term effects.  The only thing that one should be concerned about is 
having consistent lighting in the area in which the iris-scanning device is located.  Poor 
lighting may have an effect on the scanner’s results such as the case with facial 
recognition.    
Iris scanning contains both user and environmental influences.  Some user 
influences are [29]: 
· Eyelashes: Eyelashes may have an impact on how accurate the scanning 
results are because a user may have long eyelashes that may obstruct or 
confuse the scanner.   
· Iris color intensity may also affect the outcome of the scan if an 
appropriate pattern is not possible due to the color of the iris. 
· Height of the user: A very tall or very short person may have trouble 
positioning themselves to the scanning device for adequate results.  
However, the user may be seated during scanning and the scanning device 
may be placed in a universally reachable area.   
· User movement:  The user has to be able to stay still in order to get an 
adequate reading.   
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· User distance from the camera: If the user is too far from the camera then 
accurate results cannot be obtained. 
· Colored or tinted contact lenses may have an effect on user acceptance. 
· Glasses or sunglasses may also affect the outcome of the scan.  However, 
some current iris scanning devices are able to give accurate results if the 
user is wearing clear eyeglasses rather than medium or dark tinted 
sunglasses. 
 
     2.  Iris Recognition: Environmental Influences 
 
There are only a few environmental factors for iris scanning techniques: 
· Lighting level may have an effect on the iris scanning device outcome.  If 
the lighting level is too dark, an accurate picture of the iris may not be 
possible and the iris pattern that the device is seeking may not be fairly 
visible for comparison.  On the other hand, if the lighting level is too light, 
an accurate picture may still be possible but it is not known whether a 
usable iris pattern can be accessed from the picture taken.  Since the user 
is able to use an iris-scanning device from as far as 3 feet away, the 
lighting level of the room plays a significant factor on how accurate the 
scan is. 
· Obstructions in the eye will play a significant role on how accurate the 
scan is taken. For example, if there is a speck of dust in the eye or an 
eyelash inside of the eye then the iris pattern may not be obtained by the 
device. 
 
The cleanliness of the lens of the scanning device plays a significant role in 
obtaining accurate results so the camera lens must be kept clean at all times thus free of 
any dirt or dust particles, smears, or scratches.  Of the influences that are mentioned, 
none of them pose a serious threat to the scanning device but they must be taken into 
consideration because they are just little mistakes that the user or administrator of the 
device may not think will affect the device or the output from the scanning procedure.   
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E.  INTRODUCTION TO RETINA RECOGNITION 
 
Retina and iris scanning are similar because they are both focused on the eye of 
the user but they are very different from each other because of what these biometric 
methods use as a basis for their measurements.  A retina scanning system records 
elements of the blood vessel patterns of the retina on the inside rear portion of the 
eyeball.  A camera is used, analogous to iris scanning, to acquire the image in order to 
map a distinct pattern that is used in comparison to existing template information for the 
legitimate user.  The retina exhibits the characteristic that the blood vessel patterns 
remain stable throughout a person’s lifetime.   
With retina scanning, the user must look into a receptacle and focus on a given 
point.  This technique requires that the user have close physical contact with the device, 
which may or may not be acceptable to some users.  Retina scanning is not convenient 
for those who wear glasses or those who have concerns about having close physical 
contact with the device.  Since a low intensity light is used to record the blood vessel 
pattern of the retina, it is not known if there are any long-term effects by using this 
technique for long periods of time.   
The retinal image is difficult to capture and during enrollment the user must focus 
on a point while holding very still so the camera can perform the capture properly. The 
only thing that is actually determined is the pattern of the blood vessels, but since this 
pattern is unique in each person, identification can be precise.   
 
1.  Retinal Recognition: How It Works 
 
Retina scanning maps the capillary pattern of the retina, a thin nerve in the back 
of the eye.  The subject must be within a half- inch from the device and is required to keep 
his or her head and eye motionless as they focus on a small rotation point of green light.  
Infrared light is used because blood vessels on the retina absorb this light faster than the 
surrounding eye tissue.  A video camera captures the retinal pattern and translates it into 
data that is 35 bytes in size.   
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For recognizing the patterns, about 400 unique points on the blood vessels are 
recorded [30, 31].  For recognizing patterns, the previously enrolled pattern (stored 
template) is compared with against the live blood vessel pattern (live template) of the 
individual.  As with fingerprints, each individual possesses a unique blood vessel pattern 
in his or her retina.  The information contained in the unique blood vessel patterns in the 
retina would be difficult to spoof because an attacker cannot easily fake these patters 
either by using fake eyes, a photograph, or a video.   
 
2.  Retinal Recognition: User Influences 
 
The user-based influences for retina scanning are almost similar to the user based 
influences for iris scanning with little differences.  Some user-based influences are [29]: 
· User height: As explained previously, a user’s height may have an affect 
on how well they are able to reach or use the scanning device.  This 
problem may be alleviated because some scanning devices are able to 
move up and down to fit the users’ height perfectly.  
· User movement: If the user has too much eye movement, especially when 
using retina scanning, it will have an effect on the reliability of the scan. 
 
F.  INTRODUCTION TO FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION 
 
Every person possesses unique fingerprints from any other individual.  As with 
other biometric methods, fingerprint identification is based on two basic premises: 
· Invariance: The basic characteristics of the fingerprint do not change with 
time.  However, there are instances where a fingerprint reader may not 
accept a legitimate user because of a cut on the finger or dry skin. 
· Singularity: The fingerprint is unique to each individual and no two people 
have the same pattern of fingerprints.   
Fingerprint-based identification has been used for a long time and is routinely 
used in forensic laboratories and identification units all around the world.  Fingerprint 
evidence has also been accepted in courts of law for nearly a century [21].  The 
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population as a whole is familiar with fingerprint identification methods and this 
familiarity makes this technique have a high user acceptance rate.  In my own experience, 
I had to use a fingerprint scanner while applying for my California Driver License and 
the device was not hard to use and the process was pretty rapid.  The only step that I took 
though was enrolling into the system and I didn’t have to go through any matching 
process.  The scanning device that I used to get my drivers license was an optical scanner.  
As I looked at the monitor to see my resulting fingerprint image I noticed how clear the 
image was.   
Fingerprint patterns can be represented by a large number of features [31] 
including the overall ridge flow pattern, ridge, frequency, location and position of 
singular points.  It would probably be difficult to guess the digital representation of a 
fingerprint pattern without having the actual finger present.   
 
1.  How Fingerprint Recognition Works 
 
A fingerprint-scanning device is pretty easy to use.  The user must place his or her 
finger on the device and certain characteristics of the fingerprint image are extracted into 
templates known as minutiae.  The characteristics of each finger are different from each 
other.   
Recall that finger-scanning systems only store data about specific points of the 
fingerprint.  The only way an attacker would be able to spoof a user to a finger scanning 
system is by having a legitimate user present his or her finger to the scanning device or to 
somehow obtain an image of a legitimate user’s fingerprint.  If the flight deck biometric 
authentication system includes fingerprint-scanning device, liveness testing must be 
employed.  One way to employ liveness testing in fingerprint scanning is to have the 
device equipped with a “heartbeat checking” mechanism which would measure whether a 
heart beat or pulse is present while the user is touching the device.  This would require 
the user to hold his or her finger on the scanning device a little bit longer than usual.   
As with other biometric methods, general fingerprint matching process involves 
three phases: 
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· The acquisition phase or enrollment is where the fingerprint is scanned 
using a fingerprint sensor.  Many sensors are available that capture a 
fingerprint based on the optical, capacitive, pressure, thermal, or 
ultrasound domain.  The capturing of the image is made easier because the 
sensors only require a simple touch of a finger.   
· The live presentation phase is when the user shows his/her biometric 
information to the biometric device. 
· During the matching phase, the features of the scanned fingerprint (live 
template) are compared to the stored template in the database 
 
Since traditional methods of fingerprinting (i.e. fingerprint capturing using ink 
and paper) are not used that often in fingerprint recognition technology, we are able to 
capture more details of that fingerprint.  In addition, the newer methods of fingerprint 
recognition are more hygienic and less intrusive.  In order for the system to offer accurate 
results the user has to be willing to use it correctly and they have to be willing to fully 
understand how the system works.  For example, the user will have to know how long 
they would have to press their finger on the reader in order to obtain accurate results.   
 
 
2.  Fingerprint Recognition: User Influences 
      
Fingerprint recognition methods contain influences that may affect the outcome of 
the authentication process of the device.  Some influences are [29]: 
· Fingernail growth may have an effect on how firmly the user is able to 
place his/her finger on the scanning device.  This may result in inaccurate 
results from the device or the user may be rejected altogether by the 
system.  This influence also extends itself to the use of artificial nails that 
the user may apply to real fingernails.   
· Fingerprint fineness may also have an effect on how the device is able to 
pick up details of the fingerprint.  This depends on how well the depth and 
the spacing of ridges are on the users fingers.  This influence is not 
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controllable by the user so proper enrollment from the beginning needs to 
be done as well as proper placement of the finger on the scanning device 
at the time of authentication.  There may be fingerprint-scanning devices 
that alleviate this influence by offering a sensitive “touching area” for the 
user. 
· The condition of the fingerprint may have an effect on the outcome of the 
device because the user may have dry, cracked, or damp fingers.  If the 
user has dry, cracked, or damp fingers at the time of enrollment or at the 
time of authentication the scanning device may not be sensitive enough to 
compensate for these characteristics.  Another influence that falls into this 
category is scars and/or scratches on the fingertips of the user.  Scars and 
scratches, depending on their location, may cover up some important 
characteristics of the fingerprint that the scanning device is looking for to 
extract.  On the other hand, it may be possible for the scanning device to 
simply use the scar on the fingertip as a part of the characteristic extracted.   
 
· Temperature of the user’s finger or hand.  The temperature of the user’s 
finger may cause inaccurate results from scanning device.  I have 
personally spoken with people who have told me that their fingerprint-
scanning device continuously rejects them usually in the morning because 
their fingertips were too cold.  This may also have an effect on the device, 
if in fact; the device does liveness tests based on temperature of the finger 
rather than on a pulse on the fingertip.   
 
3.  Fingerprint Recognition: Techniques 
      
The techniques used to gather fingerprint information has changed greatly over 
the years.  Some sophisticated fingerprint scanning methods have emerged since the 
beginnings of this method of identification.  Some sophisticated methods currently 
available are [30]:  
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· Optical sensors with CCD or CMOS cameras. 
The finger is placed or pushed on a plate and is illuminated by a LED light 
source.  Through a prism and a system of lenses, the image is projected on a 
camera.  Frame grabber techniques are used and the image is stored and ready 
for analysis. 
· Ultrasonic sensors. 
By using ultrasonic sensors, a scan of the fingerprint with a resolution of 
about 500 dots per inch is possible.  This technique may be able to offer 
templates, which are full of useful detail of fingerprint information.   
· Electronic field sensors. 
This technique creates an electric field with which an array of pixels can 
measure varia tions in the electric field that are caused by the ridges and 
valleys in the fingerprint. 
· Capacitive sensors. 
This technique is similar to electronic field sensors except that when the finger 
is placed on the sensor, an array of pixels measures the variation in capacity 
between the valleys and the ridges of the fingerprint. 
· Temperature sensors. 
This technique makes a distinction between the temperature of the ridges and 
the temperature of the valleys on the fingerprint.  A temperature scan can be 
taken by simply swiping the finger over the sensor. 
      
Although these techniques seem very advanced and accurate, it is still possible 
that a desperate attacker may attempt to spoof a legitimate user by creating fake fingers. 
Fake fingers can be made both by the cooperation of the legitimate user (i.e. for testing 
methods) or without the cooperation of the legitimate user by lifting a fingerprint off of a 
keyboard or coffee mug.  Those traces of fingerprints are known as latent fingerprints.  
Tsutomu Matsumoto, a Japanese cryptographer, has discovered a means to fool many of 
the commercial fingerprint scanners available using common ingredients.   
One of Matsumoto’s more interesting experiments involves latent fingerprints. He takes a 
fingerprint left on a piece of glass, enhances it with a cyanoacrylate adhesive, and then 
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photographs it with a digital camera. Using PhotoShop, he improves the contrast and 
prints the fingerprint onto a transparency sheet. Then, he takes a photo-sensitive printed-
circuit board (PCB) and uses the fingerprint transparency to etch the fingerprint into the 
copper, making it three-dimensional. (You can find photo-sensitive PCBs, along with 
instructions for use, in most electronics hobby shops.) Finally, he makes a gelatin finger 
using the print on the PCB. This fools fingerprint detectors about 80% of the time [27]. 
 
As mentioned before, the success of a biometric device lies in the acceptance of 
that device by the users.  If the device is easy to use and does not take too much user 
time, then most likely it will be accepted and used correctly.  On the other hand, if it is 
difficult to use or takes too much time from the user, the success of the device will be 
greatly reduced.  For example, in the software industry users choose to use the 
applications that are the easiest to use and that provide them with the features that they 
expect.  That factor alone may determine the popularity and success of the application 
(i.e. Microsoft Word in Windows vs. vi in UNIX).   
 
G.  INTRODUCTION TO VOICE AUTHENTICATION 
 
Everyone is familiar with voice communication and feels comfortable with it.  We 
are used to this identification process in our everyday lives, for example, it is easy for us 
to recognize a voice from long ago which is analogous to the voice authentication system 
being able to recognize and identify a voice of a legitimate user at almost any given time. 
That is what highlights the notion of using an individual’s voice to uniquely identify who 
they say they are.  Since the pilots and/or copilots already speak in the flight deck, voice 
authentication would make an excellent choice for implementation in the flight deck 
because the pilots may not have to perform extra activities in order to authenticate. 
Voice authentication is not based on voice/word recognition but rather is based on 
voiceprints.  Voice/word recognition is where complex technology transforms voice into 
text.  This type of technology transcribes spoken words into typed text for use in, for 
example, a word processing application.  Vo ice command systems that utilize word 
recognition are already being implemented in automobiles for use with the global 
positioning system (GPS) for rapid road directions.  Voice/word recognition technology 
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merely translates what a user is saying as opposed to voice authentication, which verifies 
the vocal characteristics of the individual.   
Voiceprints are created based on the highs and lows that are specific to the way an 
individual speaks. Voice authentication is probably the easiest of all biometric 
technologies to implement but at the same time is also potentially the least reliable 
because the voice is so easy to alter, even by a legitimate user.  For this reason, if voice 
authentication were to be employed in the flight deck it would have to be accompanied 
by an additional form of biometric or other authentication mechanism.   
It is said that voice authentication is not well developed, partly due to the fact that 
background noise affects its performance [30].  It is then questionable if this is the case in 
the flight deck:  “Is it so noisy in the aircraft flight deck that it would not be feasible to 
employ voice authentication?”   
 
1.  Voice Authentication: How It Works 
 
Voice authentication technology utilizes the distinctive aspects of the voice to 
verify the identity of individuals.  The pitch, tone, frequency, and volume of an 
individual’s voice can uniquely identify him or her.  The downside of voice-based 
authentication systems is that the voice is one biometric characteristic that can be easily 
duplicated (i.e. a tape recording of a legitimate user).  This method may be used to spoof 
a system that uses voice authentication by an attacker who may be able to gain a 
recording of the legitimate user’s voice.  The good thing is that the authentication process 
may involve speaking a pass phrase, sequence of numbers, or a password that may make 
it more difficult for an attacker to be able to record the correct parameters.  The pass 
phrase is something that the authorized user knows, thus this adds an extra layer of 
security.   
During enrollment and subsequent identification processes voice authentication 
systems make use of the features of the voice. Voice authentication can be easily 




2.  Voice Authentication: User Influences 
 
Although voice authentication appears to be an easy authentication method in 
both how it is implemented and how it is used, there are some user influences that must 
be addressed [29]: 
· Colds.  If the user has a cold which affects his or her voice that will have 
an effect on the acceptance of the voice-scanning device.  Any major 
difference in the sound of the voice may cause the voice-scanning device 
to react in a negative way, causing the system to reject the user. 
· Expression and volume.  If a person is trying to speak with expressions on 
their face (i.e. smiling at the same time) their voice will sound different.  
The user of the device must also be able to speak loudly and clearly in 
order to obtain accurate results. 
· Misspoken or misread prompted phrases.  If the user is required to 
authenticate by speaking a prompted phrase and they mispronounce the 
phrase, they will be rejected by the system.   
· Previous user activity may have an impact on the outcome of the voice-
scanning device.  For example, if the user is out of breath and is unable to 
speak well.  
· Background noises will interfere with the user who is trying to 
authenticate to the device.  The environment in which the user is 
authenticating to the device must be free of any major background noise.  
  
H.  BIOMETRICS VULNERABILITIES 
 
Biometrics provides the means to present personal credentials that are unique.  
Many other systems rely on passwords or tokens as a means of security measures but 
when it comes to securing the flight deck, this does not suffice.  What would cause the 
flight deck biometric authentication system to be vulnerable to attack?  A biometric 
system as a whole is only as strong as its weakest link, which may not even include the  
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actual biometric information being introduced to the system but rather, the actual system 
and/or storage of the biometric data collected from that system.   
There are several ways that a biometric system and biometric data may be 
compromised and some will be mentioned here.  System circumvention is defeating the 
way in which is system is meant to be used.  An example of system circumvention would 
be an attacker gaining access to the flight deck biometric authentication system and 
installing a backdoor thus gaining elevated privileges or total control.  Since system 
circumvention would most likely take place remotely, it would be difficult to catch such 
an attacker without careful analysis of the attack.  If an attacker were able to install a 
backdoor into one of the systems, either the flight deck biometric authentication system 
or the system that stores the biometric data, they would be able to launch various other 
types of attacks.  For example, if an attacker has access to a system that caches biometric 
signals then this makes the system vulnerable to the replay attack.  In the replay attack 
the recorded signal is replayed to the authentication system thus bypassing the sensor.  
An example of this includes the presentation of an old copy of a fingerprint image or a 
previously recorded voice of an authorized user.   
Verification fraud attempts to circumvent the system during the process of 
verification.  For example, an attacker may be able to force an authorized user to verify 
his or her identity to gain access.  If an attacker is able to get the pilot to verify his or her 
identity through force, no one would be able to tell the difference (besides the person who 
is being attacked and their co-pilot).  Enrollment fraud is another possible vulnerability in 
biometric systems.  When a person enrolls his or her biometric data into the system, it 
must be proven that they really are who they say they are.  For example, an attacker may 
be able to enroll into a system with his or her biometric data but will be known by the 
system as an authorized user.  It will be assumed that some form of identity verification 
will be performed by authorized personnel prior to user enrollment into the system.  The 
person who is in charge of enrolling biometrics into the database must be trusted and 
must follow enrollment procedures such as obtaining physical identification of the user 
who is enrolling their biometric to the system.   
Since a biometric system is possibly vulnerable to such attacks it is also possible 
that the biometric data being transmitted can be vulnerable to another set of similar 
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attacks.  Biometric data, stored in a remote location, can be vulnerable to a “man-in-the-
middle” attack.  If an attacker were to successfully “tap” into the biometric system either 
in the flight deck, at the remote storage location, or anywhere in-between, then the 
biometric data being sent across the wires to its destination (for comparison) is vulnerable 
to capture and replay attacks.  Effective countermeasures to this type of attack can 
include communication protocols requiring encryption and/or digital signatures.  
Cryptographic techniques to avoid replay attacks may include the use of a nonce value or 
timestamp associated with the biometric data being sent across the wires.  A nonce can be 
thought of as an opaque token.  A nonce/timestamp can be valid only for a certain 
instance or run of the protocol thus providing resistance to a replay attack on the 
biometric data.  It must be noted that encryption techniques cannot check for liveliness of 
a signal, so the user must do this at the point of enrollment and at every authentication 
attempt. 
Spoofing can be thought of as defeating a biometric system by introducing fake 
biometric samples or possibly forcing an authorized user to present his or her biometric to 
the system.  An example of spoofing is using a gummy (fake) finger to fool a fingerprint 
scanner.  Gummy or fake finger attacks may be performed on a biometric system in order 
to gain unauthorized access to restricted areas by mounting the fake finger against an 
already stored template of the authorized user’s biometric information.  Fake finger 
attacks may also be done during enrollment into the biometric system if authorized 
personnel are not present during user enrollment.  Gummy finger techniques were 
introduced in part F, section 3 of this chapter.  Effective countermeasures to this type of 
attack are to ensure that the biometric system is capable of performing liveness tests 
during enrollment and live presentation.   
Stored templates are also vulnerable to attack.  Stored templates may be tampered 
or manipulated with at the source of storage (i.e. the database).  The database of enrolled 
authorized individuals can either be local or remote and the database may also be 
distributed over several servers.  In the case of a biometric system employed in the flight 
deck, the database of enrolled authorized individuals could be in a remote location.  On 
the other hand, an unauthorized individual may try to modify one or more of the 
biometric representations in the database.  This may result in fraudulent individuals being 
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able to gain access to the systems and as well as providing a denial of service to 
authorized users.  One countermeasure to this type of attack is to ensure that the matching 
and storage device reside at a secure location.   
If security policies and procedures are set forth and are well understood then it is 
possible to become convinced that this system is less vulnerable to many common 
attacks.  This idea is analogous to a computer user who constantly keeps his/her virus 
signatures updated on his/her system, since they have taken the time to keep their system 
well monitored and updated then their system is less vulnerable to known attacks.   
There are some basic security principles that deserve some attention in relation to 
a biometric system: 
· Users of the biometric system should have the least amount of privileges 
necessary to complete the job.  For example, the subject who is offering 
his/her biometric to the system for acceptance would have very low to no 
privileges in terms of the biometric system.  However, the user on the 
other side of the biometric system, who is waiting for the data to arrive for 
comparison, may have a few more privileges.   
· The biometric system must be as small and simple as possible (economy 
of mechanism).  If the system is small and simple, then it would be easier 
to implement, test, and analyze.  Vulnerability testing would be easier to 
perform because in a complex system, it is more difficult to find deeply 
hidden vulnerabilities such as unauthorized access paths (however it 
should be noted that a backdoor put in by a malicious designer in the 
design phase of the device and/or software to use the device can be 
virtually impossible to locate [2]).   
· Data that is kept in the system (i.e. templates) can be thought of as objects 
and the users of the system can be thought of as the subjects.  With this in 
mind, any access to objects by subjects should be mediated, logged and/or 
monitored.  Every access to every object by subjects should be checked 
for privilege (i.e. does this person have the correct credentials to 
add/delete biometric templates?).   
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· Physical access to any part of the biometric system should be limited.  The 
database that stores the biometric templates may be located in a physically 
protected location.   
These basic security principles for biometric systems serve merely as a guideline 
for consideration in regards to requirements for a flight deck biometric authentication 
system.  Ideally we want to be able to prevent any type of attack before it actually 
happens.   
Combining these ideas we can say that the biometric system, together with 
relevant peripherals at the user interface, should be designed and implemented in such a 
way so as to render it resistant to physical attack.  Ideally, the biometric system or device 
should be resistant to tampering, and should sense and audit any tampering activity and 
report it to some central system in order to take appropriate action.   
 
I.  BIOMETRIC PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
 
The performance of biometric systems is tested usually in terms of false rejection 
rate (FRR), false acceptance rate (FAR), failure to enroll rate (FER), enrollment time, and 
verification time. The false acceptance rate is most important when security is a priority 
whereas low false rejection rates are favored when convenience is the priority. 
The biometric system employed in the flight deck must have a low false 
acceptance rate since security is the priority.  If the false acceptance rate is as low as 
possible then we have a better chance of not allowing unauthorized subjects into the 
system.  The point at which the FAR and FRR meet or crossover is known as the equal 
error rate.  This rate gives a more realistic measure of the performance of the biometric 
system rather than using either the FAR or FRR individually.   
The failure to enroll rate (FER) is the rate which a subject is unable to introduce 
his or her biometric to the system which is acceptable to the system.  For example, if 
there is a fingerprint scanning device which is very sensitive to the images presented to it 
and a subject is not able to provide a clear cut image then he or she will not be able to 
enroll into the system.  Usually, there are systems that will allow the subject several 
attempts to enroll biometric information into the system.   
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Both the enrollment and live presentation times are important factors in 
determining or testing system performance.  The enrollment time is that timeline in 
between and including the capturing of the biometric sample and creating the stored 
template of that sample. 
The verification time is a measurement of the process of live presentation.  This 
process includes the capture of the raw data, live template processing, comparison of the 
stored template to the live template and the time it takes for the system to provide a 
decision (i.e. match or non-match).  To provide the continuous authentication mechanism 
desired for the flight deck, the verification time must be near real time for a successful 
flight deck biometric authentication system.  
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III.  NEW TRENDS IN BIOMETRICS 
A.  MULTI-BIOMETRICS 
 
Biometric systems have to contend with noisy data, restricted degrees of freedom, 
and failure to enroll problems, spoof attacks, and unacceptable error rates.  In some 
situations, it may be feasible to deploy a biometric system that takes advantage of more 
than one method of identification or authentication to overcome these problems.  A 
biometric device can either be integrated with non-biometric forms of authentication or 
with other forms of biometric authentication devices.    When a biometric device is 
integrated with other forms of biometric authentication devices, it can be described as a 
“multi-biometric system”.  Multi-biometric systems may be more reliable and provide 
higher verification rates due to the presence of multiple, independent pieces of evidence 
[6].  Multi-biometric systems address the problem of non-universality, since multiple 
traits ensure sufficient population coverage, and provide anti-spoofing measures by 
making it difficult for an intruder to steal multiple biometric traits of a genuine user [6]. 
If there is a weakness in one method of biometrics, then combining it with a 
biometric method that is stronger with respect to tha t weakness will alleviate that 
problem.  For instance, it may be feasible to deploy a biometric system in the flight deck 
that consists of both fingerprint scanning and voice recognition devices.  In addition, a 
multi-biometric system may reduce the false reject rate and the failure to enroll problem 
[6].   
One must determine the logic used by a multi-biometrics system.  Each individual 
biometric method must be incorporated to logically work with the other biometric method 
that it is being combined with.  The logic of the multi-biometric system may be 
implemented in an AND configuration or in an OR configuration.   
If these two devices must work together to provide continuous authentication 
using the AND configuration, then they both must output a matching score.  It is noted in 
[6] that this type of configuration will reduce the false acceptances achieved by using 
either device by itself, but it will increase the number of false rejections.   
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It is possible that these systems may be combined in an OR configuration.  In the 
OR configuration, either device will be able to provide the continuous authentication 
needed in the flight deck.  If the OR configuration is used as noted in [6] then this type of 
configuration will reduce the number of false rejections, but increase the number of false 
acceptances.  The number of false rejections and false acceptances are based on the 
matching threshold that the administrators set the device at initially.  The matching 
threshold is used to decide between a genuine user and an impostor.   
Usually vendors of biometric devices have suggestions for setting threshold 
values according to the security level you are trying to achieve. The security level may be 
labeled as low, medium, and high.  Each security level has a threshold value associated 
with it as well.  System performance can be improved by providing separate threshold 
values for each user of the system.  In [19], it is shown that by providing separate 
threshold values for each user of the system, which consists of a combination of 
fingerprint, face, and hand geometry, the genuine accept rate is above 96%.   
Using multiple biometrics in a system may not be the best solution in some cases.  
In [15], an example is given where fingerprints and voice were used together as one 
system.  The conclusion from this study is that a strong biometric is better alone than in 
combination with a weaker one.  More analysis and testing of multi-biometric systems is 
needed in order to be able to draw clear conclusions regarding the implementation of 
such a system.       
A multi-biometric system may increase the certainty that the person is who he 
claims to be and increases the flexibility and circumstances under which someone can be 
verified.  The accuracy and performance of an authentication system may be increased by 
employing a multi-biometric system if the most compatible methods are combined 
together to produce a stronger biometric system (i.e. where weaknesses in one method are 
complemented by the strengths in the other method).  If the results of combining different 
biometric methods are not fully researched, then it is possible that a layered biometric 





1.  Multi-Biometric System “AND” Configuration 
 
 
Figure 1  Multi-Biometric System using the AND configuration 
 
Figure 1 depicts a multi-biometric system using the AND configuration In this 
configuration, it is necessary that both of the biometric methods achieve a matching score 
equal to the acceptance score set for the system (which is set up initially).  This system 
would provide high confidence that the person who is introducing their biometric 
information to the system is who he says he is.  Spoofing is more difficult because two 
biometric characteristics are used.  It is possible to set individual biometric thresholds for 
each method used or to weight one biometric method more than the other throughout the 
system as a whole.   
In [6], some formulas are presented for the false accept and false reject rates in 
terms of probabilities while using the AND configuration.  These error probabilities are 
denoted as [6]: PA(FA), and PA(FR), where PA(FA) denotes the probability of a false 
accept while using the AND configuration (PA) and where PA(FR) denotes the probability 















If the matching score for 
both fingerprint and facial is equal 
to the acceptance score set for each 
method, then there is an overall 
match.  Acceptance is achieved.   
Or if the matching score for 
either or both fingerprint or facial 
is not equal to the acceptance score 
set for each method, then there is an 
overall non-match.  Acceptance is 
not achieved.   
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As explained in [6], if the AND configuration is used to combine the two tests 1 
and 2, a False Accept can only occur if both tests 1 and 2 produce a False Accept. Thus 
the combined probability of a False Accept, PA(FA), is the product of its two probabilities 
for the individual tests:  
PA(FA) = P1(FA)P2(FA)  
 
This formula indicates that the combined probability of producing a false accept 
would be lower than either of the methods alone.  However, as explained in [6], the 
probability of producing a false reject becomes higher when combining two biometric 
methods rather than using only one biometric method alone.  The formula, as given and 
defined in [6] is: 
 
PA(FR) = 1-[1-P1(FR)][1-P2 (FR)]  
 
= P1(FR) + P2(FR) - P1(FR)P2(FR)  
 
This formula shows that the probability of producing a false reject would decrease if one 
used a single biometric method alone, rather than combining multiple biometric methods, 
especially if one is considerably stronger than the other.  Formulas for the OR 
configuration are similar except that a false reject can only occur if both biometric 





















Figure 2  Multi-Biometric system using the OR configuration 
 
Figure 2 depicts a multi-biometric system using the OR configuration, in this 
configuration, overall acceptance by the system can be achieved either by both biometric 
methods possessing a matching score equal to the acceptance score set for the system 
initially or by either biometric method possessing a matching score equal to the 
acceptance score set for the system initially.  This configuration does not provide the 
confidence that the person is who they say they are as well as the AND configuration 
does.  This configuration may decrease the false rejection rate overall because the user 
will be accepted into the system by for example, either their fingerprint template 
matching the previously stored fingerprint image or by their facial template matching the 















If the matching score for 
both or either fingerprint or facial 
is equal to the acceptance score set 
for each method, then there is an 
overall match.  Acceptance is 
achieved.   
If the matching score for 
both fingerprint and facial is not 
equal to the acceptance score set for 
each method, then there is an overall 
non-match. Acceptance is not 
achieved.   
Only one of these outcomes is possible 
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false rejection rate, the false acceptance rate will increase, which is not a good idea for 
highly secured areas.   
B.  CURRENT BIOMETRIC STANDARDS 
 
In the past, many biometric vendors created proprietary algorithms and unique 
application programming interfaces, which had similar purposes but different functions 
and parameters.  Because of this, the adoption of biometrics was very slow and they 
realized that they all needed to adopt a single application-programming interface (API) 
[30].  The current biometric standards are [30]: 
· ANSI/NIST-CSL 1-1993 
· FBI WSQ 1993 Image Compression 
· CJIS-RS-0010 FBI Appendix F & G 
· ANSI/NIST ITL 1a – 1997 
· ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 SP 500-245 
· BioAPI-2001 Specification Version 1.1 
· NISTIR 6529-2001 Common Biometric Exchange File Format 
· ANS X9.84-2001 Biometric Information Management and Security 
· ANSI/INCITS 358-2002 BioAPI Specification Version 1.1 
The ANSI/NIST-CSL 1-1993 and ANSI/NIST ITL 1a-1997 are older documents 
that focused on the use of fingerprints that were a part of the automated fingerprint 
identification systems for law enforcement.  The ANSI/NIST-CSL 1-1993 standard 
specified a logical record structure for processing mug shot, facial and scar/mark/tattoo 
image data.  The ANSI/NIST ITL 1a-1997 standard is a revision of ANSI/NIST-CSL 1-
1993 which specifies a common format to exchange the image data information between 
dissimilar systems or systems made by different manufacturers.  ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 
SP 500-245 is a revision, re-designation, and consolidation of ANSI/NIST-CSL 1-1993 
and ANSI/NIST-ITL 1a-1997. 
ANS X9.84-2001 defines the requirements for managing and securing biometric 
information for use in the financial industry.  X9.84 specifies cryptographic message 
formats and key management techniques that can be used to provide data integrity, 
authentication, and privacy for biometric matching.  The X9.84 standard defines a set of 
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mandatory requirements to manage biometric information securely.  This standard is 
focused on the security of biometrics.  This standard is not scheduled for revision until 
2004.   
Familiar high level abstractions such as enroll, verify, and identify and primitive 
functions such as capture, process, match, and create template are defined by an 
application programming interface (API) in the BioAPI Specification, version 1.1, 2001.  
This specification also defines a common data structure, which is called the Biometric 
Information Record that is used by an application as the input and output to the Biometric 
Service Provider.  The wavelet/scalar quantization (WSQ 93) algorithm1 is the FBI 
standard for digital fingerprint compression. CJIS-RS-0010 FBI Appendix F & G is a 
specification for fingerprint transmission.   
As newer biometric methods emerge and current methods are enhanced, more 
standards will emerge as well.  Many of the current biometric vendors look at the X9.84 
standard for security.  Few of the biometric vendors have begun to implement security 
methods into their applications to protect biometric information.  Several biometric 
vendors have had assessments of their products, with the goal of passing an X9.84 
examination sometime in the near future [30].   
 
 
C.  BIOMETRIC SYSTEM STUDIES 
 
1. The National Physical Laboratory Communications Electronic 
Security Group (CESG) [23] 
 
The National Physical Laboratory Communications Electronic Security Group 
(CESG) evaluated seven biometric systems from the period May to December 2000. The 
CESG performed these system tests in a normal office environment.  They tested face, 
fingerprint, hand geometry, iris, vein, and voice recognition systems.  Two fingerprint 
systems were tested, one of which was based on a fingerprint chip (i.e. smart card) and 
the other was based on an optical system.  The results from the vein-based systems will 
not be examined.   
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The systems that were tested by CESG are: 
· Visionics – FaceIt verification demo (face) 
· Fingerprint recognition system (optical) 
· HandKey II (hand geometry) 
· Iridian Technologies – IriScan System 2200 (iris) 
· OTG – Secur PBX demonstration system (voice) 
 
CESG used over 200 participants in this study ranging in ages 18 – 65 + which 
included both males and females.  There was a little bit more distribution of males in all 
of the age categories.  The failure to enroll rates that are recorded by CESG are given in 
Table 3: 






Table 3.   Failure to enroll rate 
 
The false acceptance and false rejection rates are reported in a graph with respect 
to the threshold value.  They are calculated as follows: 
 
· FAR (t) = (1 – FTA) FMR (t) 
· FRR (t) = (1 – FTA) FNMR (t) + FTA 
 
Where FTA is the failure to acquire rate, FNMR is the false non-match rate, and 
FMR is the false match rate.  The false match and non-match rates are used to measure 
the accuracy of the matching process. t represents the decision threshold.  The decision 
threshold is the value, set initially, to determine whether a user is accepted or rejected by 
the system, according to their matching score. The failure to acquire rate measures the 
proportion of attempts for which the system is unable to capture or locate a sufficient 
quality image.  This may happen simply when the image that was captured doesn’t meet 
the quality requirements of the system.   
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The failure to acquire rates as recorded by CESG are given in Table 4: 






Table 4.   Failure to acquire rate 
 
These tables exclude instances of user errors such as not correctly positioning 
fingers on the fingerprint device.  According to the graphs provided in the final report, 
the false accept rates as recorded by CESG are given in Table 5: 
 






Table 5.   False acceptance rate 
 
In this study, there were no indications as to what the false rejection rates were for 
these and corresponding methods.  The method with the highest failure to enroll rate was 
the fingerprint recognition system.    The reason for this high rate is usually due to the 
particular biometric technology being unable to read the characteristics of a given person 
for various reasons.  Influences which may affect the outcome of a fingerprint recognition 
system, including the enroll rates, are mentioned in Chapter II, section 2 of part F.   Most 
of the methods that were tested had failure to enroll rates at 0.0%.  Having a low failure 
to enroll rate is an ideal attribute in a biometric system, all of the users should be able to 
register their biometric to the system in order to be able to use it effectively.   
54 
The method with the highest failure to acquire rate was voice authentication.  
There are various reasons why this rate was so high.  One reason may be because the 
voice that was introduced to the system did not meet the quality requirements of that 
particular system.  Next in line to voice was fingerprint with a failure to acquire rate of 
0.8%.  The rest of the methods tested had a 0.0% failure to acquire rate.  Failure to 
acquire rates may lead to higher false rejection rates for authorized users.  The failure to 
acquire rate is difficult to predict or prevent because it is a factor that is not controlled by 
the system or the users (we cannot tell when enrollees will not be able to provide an 
acceptable biometric sample to the system).   
The only method that had a 0.0% false acceptance rate was iris scanning.  The rest 
of the methods and vendors that were tested were all under 1% for false acceptance rates.  
Ideally, a system should have a low false acceptance rate because then that would mean 
that it would be less likely that the system would allow an impostor to gain access to the 
system or to take control of the flight without being noticed.  The only rates that were not 
reported in this study were for the false rejection rates.  The false rejection rates may be 
calculated from the given information. 
It is important that one does not overlook these types of error rates in a biometric 
authentication system.  One way to compare systems is through the testing of these rates.  
Since we are able to make comparisons with several products and vendors, we will be 
able to make the choices that best fit our needs.  There are many products and 
competition is increasing, which means that costs may be decreasing.  More exhaustive 
tests are needed for all of these products so that we are able to choose the most beneficial 
system for our purposes. 
 
2. Multi-Biometric System Tests 
 
L. Hong and A.K. Jain [15] developed a prototype that integrates faces and 
fingerprints in authenticating personal identification.  Their proposed system overcomes 
the limitations of both facial-recognition and fingerprint-verification systems.  In order to 
test their proposed system, they used the MSU (Michigan State University) fingerprint 
database and a public domain face database.  There are a total of 1,500 fingerprint images 
of size 640x480 in the MSU fingerprint database.  The 1,500 fingerprint images come 
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from 150 individuals who have 10 images each.  These fingerprint images were captures 
with an optical scanner manufactured by Digital Biometrics. 
The face database has a total of 1,132 images of 86 individuals.  Of the total 
images, 400 came from the Olivetti Research Lab, 300 came from the University of Bern, 
and 432 came from MIT Media Lab.  The images are re-sampled and given a fixed size 
of 92x112.  A total of 590,000 (590 x 1000) face and fingerprint test pairs were generated 
and tested.  The details of this particular test are explained in [15].  The table below 
describes the false reject rates (FRR) for various values of false accept rates (FAR) for 
face, fingerprint, and integrated face/fingerprint.  As table 6 indicates, the false rejection 
rate is lower for every false accept rate value for an integrated system.  This system is 
integrated with face and fingerprint technology.  
 
      
Table 6.             False Reject Rate vs. False Accept Rate in an integrated system 
 









Having reviewed a variety of biometric techniques, the next chapter will present 
two designs for in-flight biometric authentication systems.  
False Reject Rate ( FRR)   
False 
Accept Rate 
Face Fingerprint Integration 
1 % 15.8 % 3.9 % 1.8 % 
0.1 % 42.2 % 6.9 % 4.4 % 
0.01 % 61.2 % 10.6 % 6.6 % 
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IV.  PROPOSED DESIGN FOR IN-FLIGHT BIOMETRIC SYSTEM 
The intent of the flight deck biometric authentication system is to provide a strong 
guarantee of identification. The system must provide assurance that the identity of the 
person is correct and that the identity is unique.  Requirements for the flight deck 
biometric authentication system include reliability, ease of use, and non- intrusiveness.  
The authentication system should provide continuous and accurate operation.  Authorized 
users should be allowed access and unauthorized users should be prohibited, without 
interruption or deterioration in performance, accuracy or speed.   
The biometric device or system of devices onboard the aircraft must be physically 
secured such that it does not become vulnerable to attack, theft, or tampering.  Controlled 
access to the flight deck can be achieved by implementing a biometric device outside of 
the flight deck doors as suggested in this study.  A clear and concise set of security 
policies for the use of the biometric system must be defined and set in place.  The main 
reason for these security policies is to ensure that the operation and security of the 
biometric system is adequate.   
Periodic inspection of the system will be necessary to ensure proper functioning 
under any type of conditions.  Lastly, even if layered biometrics is employed in the flight 
deck, the system, as a whole, is required to be small and easy to understand.  This non-
complex design of the biometric authentication system will be useful in the event of a 
system failure.  In such an event, if the system is small and easy to understand it will be 
easier to restore even under extreme conditions.    
 
A.  BIOMETRIC SYSTEM PROCESS 
 
All biometric systems basically follow the same set of processes for biometric 




Figure 3  Basic Biometric System Process 
 
Biometric capture takes place at the biometric device (i.e. fingerprint scanner).  
The image of the biometric is processed using specific algorithms tailored for that 
biometric method to produce a live template.  The live template of the biometric is a 
numerical representation of the currently acquired biometric.  From the storage device, 
the template of the biometric which was stored as part of user enrollment, is retrieved and 
should match the value from the live template.  When this occurs a biometric match is 
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B.  PROPOSED DESIGNS FOR BIOMETRICS IN THE FLIGHT DECK 




                     
Figure 4  Proposed Design #1 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the process of a biometric system is a little more 
complicated than that of just the basic biometric system process.  These processes are 
labeled to show the order in which certain activities take place.  Label 1 in Figure 4 
represents the distributed enrollment facilities.  The distributed enrollment facility is 
where the subject will enroll his/her biometric characteristic to the system for the first 
time.  The enrollment process is fairly simple because this is where the ID of the person 
is checked physically (i.e. drivers license) and their biometric information is entered into 
the database of authorized biometrics.  The enrollment facilities are distributed such that 
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enrollment facility will have the same authorized user database as the other enrollment 
facilities in order to provide redundancy.  Redundancy avoids a single point of failure. 
Label 6 in Figure 4 represents the distributed matching facilities.  This is where 
the stored biometric templates, transferred from the enrollment facilities (label 2) are 
compared against the live biometric templates that are transferred from the flight deck 
(labels 3, 4, and 5).  Labels 3, 4, and 5, in Figure 4 represent the live biometric template 
that is encrypted and communicated to the distributed matching facilities via secured 
communication channels.  At the matching facility, the stored and encrypted biometric 
template is decrypted and compared to the live template that was received from the flight 
deck of the aircraft (label 6).  It is necessary to have distributed matching facilities such 
that all of the different flight decks that are sending information are not confined to 
sending biometric templates to one facility, thus possibly causing a communication 
channel or processing bottleneck. 
The physical location of the biometric device(s) is within the flight deck (Figure 
4, label 3).  This is where the authorized user attempts to authenticate.  This 
authentication process is as follows: 
· Authorized user introduces his/her biometric information to the biometric 
device 
· The biometric device captures the biometric information 
· An image of the biometric information is extracted, which is represented 
numerically 
· The image goes through processing using an algorithm tailored to the 
specific method of biometrics used. 
· A live template is then extracted, which is also represented numerically 
 
Once the live template is captured, it must be encrypted and is sent through the 
communications channel to the matching facility securely.  Once a match is made, the 
appropriate matching facility will send an acknowledgement message back to the 
authorized user in the flight deck.  This acknowledgement, which is sent from the 
matching facility back up to the flight deck (Figure 4, label 7.1), may not be necessary; 
this depends upon the overall design.  Sometimes matches between the live and stored 
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biometric templates are not possible.  In this case, there are two possible feedback 
messages.  The first one may be a “retry” message, prompting the authorized user to re-
enter his/her biometric information.  This feedback message may be logged by the 
system.  The second feedback message is related to an authentication failure.  This 
authentication failure message will be logged and sent to appropriate situation assessment 
personnel, which can include stewardess, air marshal, or ground personnel.   
It is important to note that the matching results, positive or negative, may be 
reported to situation assessment personnel on the ground (or elsewhere) and not to the 
personnel in the flight deck; or the matching results may be reported to both the situation 
assessment personnel (Figure 4, label 7.2) and the flight deck crew (Figure 4, label 7.1), 
depending on policies and design.  There are many similar situations that may take place, 
but it is not feasible to go through every possible situation in this study. 
The authentication, matching, and acceptance (or rejection) can all take place 
inside of the flight deck. This scenario would eliminate the need for the secure 
communication channel between the matching facilities and the flight deck; thus 
eliminating any vulnerability associated with the communication channel.   
A second proposed design follows from Figure 4 with some small modifications.  
In the second design both the distributed matching and enrollment facilities would still 
exist, but an additional matching device would be needed in the flight deck in order to 
accomplish live presentation, matching, and acceptance (or rejection) onboard the 
aircraft.  The device that would be required to have in the flight deck is a trusted, 
hardened, and tamperproof PC.  Below are reasons why we would need a PC onboard the 
aircraft: 
· The distributed enrollment facilities will maintain DVDs that contain all 
biometric templates used for authentication in the flight deck.  The DVDs 
will include a copy of the database of existing and new biometric 
templates that have been introduced to the enrollment facilities. 
· These DVDs would be distributed between the distributed matching 
facilities and the various aircrafts that have the trusted and tamperproof 
PCs onboard. 
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· The trusted and tamperproof matching device will be onboard the aircraft 
along with the biometric device.  Thus it is possible to authenticate, match, 
and reach acceptance in the flight deck in near real time. 
· Once acceptance is reached in the flight deck, someone on the ground or 
in the aircraft (e.g. air marshals or stewardess) will be sent a signal (yes or 
no) letting them know if authentication and matching were successful 
onboard the aircraft.  This process is shown in more detail in Figure 5.  
 
 
2.  Design #2 
 
 
Figure 5  Proposed Design #2  
 
Figure 5 depicts the second design scenario for employing flight deck biometric 
authent ication.  In this scheme, as compared to Design #1, there is no need for the two 
secured communication channels between the matching facilities (Figure 5, label 3.1) and 
the aircraft (not shown here).  Just like Design #1, Design #2 also contains the distributed 
enrollment and matching facilities (Figure 5, labels 1 and 3.1).  The distributed 
enrollment facilities serve the same purpose as in proposed Design #1.  However, the 
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will be used as a backup in the event of an emergency (e.g. if something happens to the 
PC onboard the aircraft then the authorized personnel will still be able to perform 
matching by communicating with the matching facility).  The same security policies that 
were described for Design #1 also apply here. 
The biometric device is responsible for acquiring the user’s biometric data and in 
both designs this device is in the flight deck.  In Design #2, as opposed to Design #1, a 
matching device is onboard the aircraft (but not necessarily inside the flight deck).  Either 
the matching device or the actual biometric device can be the feature extraction unit.   
The matching device includes trusted DVD media that contains updated biometric 
template databases, generated at the enrollment facilities.  Both the aircraft and the 
distributed matching facilities have these DVDs and the enrollment facilities distribute 
updates when necessary to the appropriate locations.  It is not exactly known how often 
the biometric database will change, but it is important that each aircraft has the most 
recent copy of the database onboard the aircraft and the DVDs that contain old 
information are destroyed.   
The secure handling of the DVDs must be taken into consideration since they 
contain valuable information.  These DVDs will only be produced at the enrollment 
facilities and will be physically protected until they are distributed to the emergency 
matching facilities and the matching device onboard the aircraft, as shown in Figure 5, 
label 3.2.  The actual process of exchanging this DVD from the source to the flight deck 
is not discussed in this study, but it is important that this DVD must be exchanged from 
the source to the flight deck securely so that we are ensured that the DVD has not been 
tampered with or exchanged with counterfeit DVDs containing false information.  
The matching device onboard the aircraft, as shown in label 4 in Figure 5, should 
contain its own backup system and a backup battery pack in the event of a power failure.  
Since the PC onboard the aircraft is not connected to any other outside device, it is not 
vulnerable to common network attacks.  The location of the PC within the aircraft may 
pose a vulnerability. If the PC is readily viewable, then it becomes vulnerable to theft, but 
as shown in Figure 5, the PC is physically secured.  One requirement for the PC onboard 
the aircraft is that it is tamperproof.  One should not be able to tamper with the PC thus 
making any information contained within it vulnerable to theft or modification.  This PC 
64 
should contain as few applications as possible.  For example, one may want to have a 
basic operating system along with the corresponding software needed to use the biometric 
device.  All unnecessary services such as telnet, ftp, and http should be disabled in order 
to eliminate any vulnerabilities present in those applications.  The physical security and 
tamperproof properties of the onboard PC are analogous to the physical security and 
tamperproof properties of the onboard black box.  The integrity and security of this PC 
will remain at a high level since unauthorized personnel or the general public will not be 
aware of the physical location nor what it is used for.    
 The user may be able to digitally sign their biometric information at the time of 
enrollment with a smart card, for example, to add another layer of security to the 
biometric template.  The smart card can then be presented to the system at the time of live 
capture, as well as for enrollment.   
 
3.  Enrollment Facility: Initial Identification and Enrollment 
 
Figure 6 Enrollment facilities initial Identification and Enrollment Process 
 
Figure 6 represents the initial enrollment process that takes place at the distributed 
enrollment facilities.  Initially, the authorized person in charge at the various enrollment 


















system users (i.e. photo ID).  Once the authorized personnel positively identify the 
legitimate user, they are allowed into the system; otherwise they are denied enrollment 
access and must provide adequate identification.  Once the user’s biometric information 
is accepted by the biometric device it will be placed in the database and they will receive 
training on how to properly use the device in the flight deck.  This whole process will be 
identical at all of the enrollment facilities.  The biometric device(s) will be physically 
secured and audit logs will be performed in order to keep track of the number of users 
who enroll their biometric data into the database. 
The user training process will take as long as the user feels fit.  It may take a 
while for some users to become comfortable with the device(s) and they may need more 
training time.  On the other hand, other users will be very comfortable with the device(s) 
and will need less training time.  The users will be fully trained prior to implementation 
and use of the flight deck biometric authentication system. It is also possible that a 
training class could be provided for several users at one time.   
 
4.  Enrollment Facility: Biometric Data Enrollment to Trusted DVD 
Storage 
 



































Figure 7 represents the process that occurs between biometric data enrollment and 
DVD storage of the template.  This process begins with the biometric data enrollment.  
Once the device has captured the biometric data, a template is generated.  This template 
will be used later for comparison at the time of authentication/matching.  If the biometric 
data is not successfully converted into its equivalent template then the biometric data 
must be re-enrolled into the system.  After the biometric data has been converted into its 
equivalent template, it will be stored into the database, along with the biometric templates 
of other authorized users.  If there is a problem with the database storage, the process of 
capturing the biometric from the user and storage is attempted again until success has 
been reached.  When the database storage of the template is successful, the biometric 
template will be stored into the backup database at the enrollment facility and then stored 
into a trusted DVD.  This process corresponds to the proposed Design #2, where a trusted 
DVD is needed at both the matching facilities and onboard the aircraft. 
When multi-biometrics is used, multiple types of biometric data must be stored on 
the DVD; the user will simply enroll additional biometric data into the system which will 
go through the same process again.   
There are various loops in this process in order to alleviate problems. For 
example, if there is a biometric template awaiting storage into the database and it is not 
properly stored, the storage is attempted again until there is success or else the process 
must be started all over again.  Also included in this process is a storage queue.  This 
queue will be useful when several users are enrolling their biometric data and they all 
reach the storage area at the same time.  If a queue were not available, that would restrict 










5.  Trusted DVD Distribution 
 
 
Figure 8 Trusted DVD Distribution Process for Proposed Design #2 
 
Figure 8 shows the process of DVD distribution from the enrollment facilities to 
the matching facilities and then to the biometrically integrated aircrafts.  Each of the 
enrollment and matching facilities will keep a storage area for the trusted DVDs for the 
purpose of redundancy and backup.  It is assumed that the DVDs will be conveyed to the 
different areas securely.  Each DVD will be taken to the area where the trusted PC resides 
























Figure 9 Process of Single Biometric Authentication Onboard the Aircraft for 
Proposed Design #2 
 
Figure 9 represents the process of authentication using a single biometric device 
onboard the aircraft assuming the implementation of Design #2.  The pilot or co-pilot will 
perform biometric authentication inside the flight deck via the biometric device.  The 
trusted PC onboard the aircraft will receive the biometric template and will perform 
matching.  Since there may be a mistake in the capture of the biometric, depending on the 
method, its capture error rate, and the security policy of the organization, the user may be 
given at least 3 chances for biometric capture in the flight deck. The number of chances 
for the user to introduce his/her biometric to the device is not limited to 3 (although that 
is very typical).   
In the event of acceptance, a notification will be sent to both the user of the 
biometric device in the flight deck (or another person in the flight deck) and another 
authorized person (i.e. Air Marshall or Situation Assessment Personnel who may or may 
not be at a remote location).  This process of authentication in the flight deck can either 
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be used for continuous authentication (i.e. with a video camera for facial recognition) or 
for periodic authentication (i.e. the pilot or co-pilot introducing their fingerprint to a 
fingerprint scanner every n times within m seconds or minutes, where n and m will be 
defined according to the biometric method used).   
In the event of a rejection, a notification will be sent to both the user of the 
biometric device inside the flight deck and another authorized person, as described above.  
The only difference here is the fact that the user will be given c chances to authenticate in 
the flight deck.  In figure 9, c is 3 times and c is incremented every time an attempted 
biometric data capture is done.  If the value of c is equal to 3 (in this example) then 
notification will be sent to situation assessment personnel and proper action will be taken.   
 




Figure 10 Process of Authentication Onboard the Aircraft using Multi-Biometrics 
with the AND Configuration for Proposed Design #2 
 
Figure 10 represents the use of multi-biometrics in the flight deck using the AND 
configuration.  This process requires the use of two or more biometric methods in the 
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flight deck.  This example shows the use of two biometric methods (e.g. fingerprint 
scanning and facial recognition) although we are not restricted to only using two methods 
(the system becomes more complicated), nor are we restricted to only using these two 
methods (we can have a combination of any biometric me thods together).  In this 
example, there are two templates generated, template #1 and template #2.  Also, there are 
two variables declared, retry1 and retry2.  These variables are used to keep a count of the 
number of attempts that the user has tried each biometric method.  Every time the 
templates are sent to the trusted PC, the values of retry1 and retry2 are incremented (their 
initial values are set to zero).  As described in the previous example, the user may be 
given at least x number of chances to authenticate just in case there are problems with the 
initial or second authentication attempt.  The AND configuration requires that there be a 
positive match from both of the biometric methods with no exceptions. 
As this example shows, each template is sent to the trusted PC onboard the 
aircraft for matching.  Ideally, if there is a positive match for both biometric methods on 
the first try, the user is accepted and notification is sent to another authorized person such 
as a stewardess, air marshal, or situation assessment personnel who may or may not be in 
a remote location.  It does not matter which biometric data is presented to the system 
first.  
In the event that one biometric method has a positive match and the other one 
doesn’t, the user will be given a number of chances to provide an adequate sample to the 
system and they will not have to introduce the biometric data which has been positively 
matched again, only the data which has not been positively matched.  If the user cannot 
authenticate with either one of the biometric methods, they are rejected by the system, 
notification is sent to the appropriate personnel for action.   
The presentation of each form of biometric data to the devices does not have to be 
done in parallel (i.e., the user should not have to be speaking and presenting their 
fingerprint at the same time) although acceptance from the system requires two or more 
positively matched biometric traits.  The use of multi-biometrics in the AND 
configuration may be able to enhance the needed positive identity of who is flying the 
aircraft since it is more difficult to “steal” two different biometric traits from the 
authorized user and successfully gain a match from both.   
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Figure 11 Process of Authentication Onboard the Aircraft using Multi-Biometrics 
with the OR Configuration for Proposed Design #2 
 
Figure 11 represents the process of authentication in the flight deck using multi-
biometrics with the OR configuration.  Here, the user in the flight deck does not need to 
have a match for both of the biometric traits introduced to the device.  Only one 
biometric trait has to be positively matched for overall acceptance.  The variables retry1 
and retry2 are similar to the previous AND configuration and are incremented and used 
the same way.  The user in the flight deck is given a number of chances to introduce 
his/her biometric to the device for positive matching.  If the user has retried both 
biometric traits at least three times (in this example) then he or she is rejected by the 
system and notification is sent to appropriate personnel.  This process is simpler than the 
AND configuration in that the user in the flight deck does not need to have two or more 
positive biometric matches and the restrictions are lessened.  
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9. Flight Deck Biometric Authentication System Configuration 
Summary 
 
Sections 7 and 8 describe different scenarios in which the flight deck biometric 
authentication system can be configured using multi-biometrics.  The simplest design 
comes from implementing one biometric device in the flight deck and implementing a 
trusted PC onboard the aircraft for matching purposes.  If only one biometric device is 
used in the flight deck, there would be no need for the different configurations as 
described for multi-biometrics.   
The AND and OR configurations are described and their processes are graphically 
depicted to show how much they differ from each other. Multi-biometrics introduces 
complexity but also introduces choices.  These choices arise from deciding which 
biometric methods to combine to deciding which configuration to use for the combined 
methods.  These examples represent a general idea on how the process works and do not 
confine the designer to a particular set of biometric methods.  Once there have been more 
studies in the area of multi-biometrics, it will be easier to combine the most compatible 
biometrics and there may be more choices available as multi-biometrics continues to 
mature.   
In these scenarios, the process of matching is done onboard the aircraft.  This is 
made possible by integrating a trusted PC somewhere in the aircraft, as described in the 
discussion of proposed design #2.  This PC does not necessarily need to be in the flight 
deck, it can reside anywhere in the aircraft as long as it is protected from theft or 
modification.   Furthermore, the notification of acceptance or rejection messages do not 
need to be relayed to the personnel in the flight deck; this depends on how the final 
design is implemented; however, the notification of acceptance or rejection does need to 
be relayed to a person external to the flight deck.  It is also possible to have a system that 
will only log acceptances, raising a flag when a rejection occurs.  Whether a single 
biometric method or multi-biometrics is used, there are many possibilities as to how they 
can be implemented.   
The processes for proposed Design #1 would be similar to Design #2, except that 
there is not a trusted DVD mechanism and there would not be a trusted PC onboard the 
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aircraft. Once the pilot and/or co-pilot introduce their biometric to the device in the flight 
deck, their biometric template would need to be communicated back to the distributed 
matching facilities for matching.   
 
10.  Comparison of Proposed Designs  
 
Design #2 is simpler than Design #1 because of the absence of the secure 
communication channels.  Both designs contain an extra entity; this extra entity is the 
situation assessment personnel, who will receive the result of authentication attempts 
from the flight deck.  There are different ways in which the results can be relayed to the 
appropriate personnel.  Relay of this message can be as simple as sending a page to a 
pager or sending a telephone call to the appropriate situation assessment personnel.  As 
mentioned in Design #1, it may not be necessary to relay every single acceptance to the 
situation assessment personnel because it simply may not be necessary.  On the other 
hand, it may be practical to relay every rejection from the system in order to take 
appropriate action.  Depending on how the biometric response system is set up, rejection 
results may need to be conveyed back to the flight deck so that the user has additional 
chances to authenticate.  The biometric system on board the aircraft, whether it is a single 
biometric system or a multi-biometric system, should allow authorized personnel 
multiple chances to authenticate because not all attempts will be perfect. 
Proposed design #1 appears to be secure, if implemented correctly.  The main 
problem with this design is the need for more secured communication channels, which 
may allow the biometric process/system as a whole to become more vulnerable to various 
types of attacks.  This design may be used with a single biometric system or with multi-
biometrics.  If one does not feel comfortable in having a secured PC on board the aircraft, 
as proposed in Design #2, then this can be thought of as an alternate design scenario.   
One type of overhead added to Design #1 is encryption of the biometric templates 
conveyed to the matching facilities.  Encryption is a good mechanism, but it also has its 
own set of vulnerabilities.  There are both weak and strong encryption schemes and if an 
extremely secure and strong encryption scheme were to be employed, it would be at the 
cost of processing and communication time.  Is it necessary to encrypt the result from the 
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biometric system as it is being conveyed between the matching facilities and the flight 
deck?  If this were necessary, then it would also be at the expense of processing time.   
Design #2 seems to be the most feasible solution, because of its simplicity.  This 
simplicity may reduce some of the vulnerabilities that were present in Design #1.  First of 
all, there is no need for encryption of the biometric templates, since they are not being 
relayed to external destinations.  Since the matching process is done in the aircraft, there 
is no need to worry about man in the middle attacks while relaying biometric template 
information to the distributed matching facilities.  The only process that is not done 
onboard the aircraft is the enrollment of the biometric trait into the system.  It is not 
necessary to perform this process onboard; it is too dangerous because there is not 
enough time to perform enrollment onboard and it is safer to know that the authorized 
personnel will already have their biometric stored in the database and securely written to 
the trusted DVD.   
Both designs contain distributed enrollment facilities.  Security mechanisms 
should be set forth in order to have policies and procedures at these distributed facilities.  
For example, every facility must ensure that they contain the same information as the 
other facilities do.  Every enrollment facility must have the same biometric template 
database as the other enrollment facilities.  The matching facilities will also have up-to-
date database information (i.e. accurate as to when new users are added/deleted from the 
database) and will contain the same information as the enrollment facilities except that 
the matching facilities are used (only) to match live templates with previously stored 
templates for Design #1, and only in the event of an emergency for Design #2.   
A strict security policy should be set in place for enrollment facilities as well.  
The personnel at the enrollment facilities are responsible for checking the identification 
of the users who wish to enroll their biometric traits into the large database.  This 
physical identification scheme adds an extra layer of security because we will be aware 






C.  FLIGHT DECK PROCEDURES AND BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 
 
In order to maintain efficiency pilots, co-pilots, and other authorized aircraft 
personnel must follow certain procedures every time they go to work.  The flight deck is 
a complex system in itself and it takes skilled and alert personnel to operate all of the 
buttons and switches that are located therein.  As stated in [8], in complex human-
machine systems such as the flight deck, successful operations depend on an elaborate set 
of procedures.  These procedures are the tasks performed by the pilot and/or co-pilot.  In 
order to perform the required tasks, the authorized personnel must be able to follow a 
well-defined set of rules and guidelines, which are clearly defined in the documents that 
are located there.  If there are checklists provided for the crew, everything will be 
completed with no problems as long as the checklist is followed in the intended manner.   
In the case of the flight deck, there exists a set of standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) [8].  These procedures provide the crew with a step-by-step guidance for carrying 
out certain operations.  It is important to be able to understand what aircraft personnel are 
doing prior, during, and after a flight segment so that deployment of a biometric system 
for continuous authentication will not interfere with their procedural obligations.  It is 
equally important that such a biometric system in the flight deck does not overwhelm 
aircraft personnel with biometric obligations forcing them to ignore their normal 
procedures or fail to properly make use of the biometric authentication device.   
Standardization of procedures for operations in the flight deck is a critical aspect 
of flight operations because crewmembers are paired up for each trip without 
consideration of whether they know each other; paring operations are done remotely, and 
no direct management supervision is maintained [8].  It must be ensured that the 
procedures for using continuous biometric authentication in the flight deck are well 
designed such that there is no confusion as to how those procedures are supposed to be 
performed.  The procedures must be straightforward because a procedure that is 
ponderous and is perceived as increasing workload, and/or interrupting the smooth flow 
of flight deck tasks will probably be ignored [8].  Ignoring the task of authenticating 
using the biometric system in the flight deck should never become an issue. 
Many flight deck procedures are dependant on the activities of exterior agents 
such as air traffic controllers.  This idea is analogous to the procedures that must be 
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followed in order to correctly conduct biometric authentication in the flight deck because 
not only do the aircraft personnel have to authenticate themselves but it is possible that 
someone on the ground is waiting for authentication data to be transmitted.  This idea is 
the same for the authenticating subject (i.e. the aircraft personnel using the biometric 
device) because they have to depend and wait for the biometric system to respond.  That 
is why communication between the biometric device in the flight deck and the external 
agent (i.e. the trus ted computer operator on the receiving end) needs to be clear and 
concise.  It is equally important that the communication information be transmitted in a 
secure and reliable way. 
There are two factors, which affect the flow of procedures in the flight deck [8]: 
· The sequencing of tasks and procedures and 
· Actual scheduling of tasks and procedures 
 
The designer of the SOPs and checklists specifies the sequencing of tasks and 
procedures and the actual scheduling of tasks and procedures is conducted by the flight 
deck crew [8, 9].  Since these two factors affect the flow of procedures currently being 
conducted in the flight deck, the sequencing and scheduling of the procedures for 
biometric authentication in the flight deck must leave current tasks and procedures 
undisturbed. Procedures for biometric authentication should be compatible with the 
biometric technology being deployed as well as with existing flight deck procedures.   
Checklists for airline personnel ensure the safety of the flight. It is important that 
the authorized personnel follow checklists precisely.  The checklist procedure is supposed 
to verify that the plane is configured correctly [9] but some people argue that there is no 
guarantee of absolute safety simply by completing the tasks that are on the checklist.  
This argument pertains to long and detailed checklists, which may pose a problem in the 
event that a pilot may choose not to use the checklist or may conduct the procedure 
poorly because of its length [8].  If an adequate biometric system were to be employed in 
the flight deck it is possible that some tasks regarding the biometric system may be 
incorporated into existing checklists. It is also possible that a separate checklist may be 
provided which would only pertain to the biometric system at hand.  Incorporating items 
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into an existing checklist may pose a problem especially if the existing checklist is 
already long and tedious.  
If there were a biometric device to allow entrance to the flight deck integrated 
with a continuous biometric authentication system inside of the flight deck, threats may 
be minimized or the outcome different.  If the operator of the computer that is collecting 
the biometric information notices a problem, then the appropriate people can take some 
action in regard to the aircraft at risk.  The actions that are taken on an aircraft whose 
biometric authentication system sends a warning to the operator who is looking at the 
biometric data that is being sent is beyond the scope of this study.   It is important to 
point out that there are various scenarios for dealing with such situations.  There are 
measures to counter a possible take-over of an aircraft but these will not be discussed any 
further in this study.   
Certain concerns focus on the transmission of the biometric data.  There may be 
secrecy concerns coming from the subject who is using the biometric system.  Some of 
the people who may be concerned about privacy issues range from the pilots to their 
unions (Air Line Pilots Association) as well as many others who may be involved with 
the specific biometric system.  This study will focus on the secrecy and integrity of the 
data being sent (i.e. biometric data) but not on any specific privacy concerns that may 
come about by using the biometric system.   
Federal Aviation Regulation 121.385 paragraph c states that the minimum pilot 
crew is two pilots and the certificate holder shall designate one pilot as pilot in command 
and the other second in command. Since there will always be at least 2 crew members 
inside of the flight deck, the biometric system must be applicable to all authorized aircraft 
personnel within the aircraft and not restricted to only one crewmember (i.e. the pilot).  
This is important because there may be an emergency situation where the co-pilot may 
have to take over a flight and this type of event should not result in alarms from the 
biometric system.  
In order to accurately and correctly design a checklist for the biometric device in 
the flight deck; a set of guidelines would be good to have as a reference point for the 
designers of the system.  A set of guidelines for checklist design and usage is given by 
Degani and Wiener [31].  They observed 42 flight crews so that they would be able to 
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gain an insight into the process, techniques, and the potentia l problems that are associated 
with checklist usage in an operational setting.   
 
1.  Recommended Practices and Guidelines for Flight Deck Design 
 
As explained in [12], there are some recommended practices that need to be 
followed prior and during the integration of devices within the flight deck.  [12] is 
consistent with the newly developed FAA and Industry guide to Product Certification, 
published in Jan. 1999.   The sections of [12] cover every step in introducing new devices 
to the flight deck.  Topics related to this study include: Independence & Interaction, 
Training Requirements, Anthropometric Considerations, Complexity/Automation, and 
Flight deck lighting [12].   
Independence & Interaction is an important consideration when introducing a new 
device to the flight deck.  An independent, stand-alone system that does not interact with 
other aspects of the pilot interface in the flight deck would most likely require little 
analysis or evaluation.  However, for components that are more integrated with other 
systems in the flight deck and/or with higher levels of interaction and that perform 
functions critical to safe flight, more in-depth evaluations with greater fidelity will need 
to be conducted.  The flight deck biometric authentication system could be stand-alone, 
independent of other cockpit devices.  
Training Requirements for new devices introduced to the flight deck should be 
clearly defined. Products that are relatively simple to learn and operate in the flight deck 
would most likely require little analysis or evaluation [12]. 
The analysis and evaluation of the flight deck biometric authentication system 
would be carried out prior to actual deployment.  In [12], it is mentioned that the goal is 
to make the system as simple to use as possible so that little or no training is required.  A 
flight deck biometric authentication system may require user training to ensure its correct 
use.  It would be nearly impossible to deploy a system and not expect its users to be fully 
trained and familiar with the system.  This idea is analogous to deploying a new “office 
suite” package; upper management and whoever else uses the application ideally would 
be properly trained prior to usage.   
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Some anthropometrical considerations are the comfortable use and accessible 
placement of the biometric device in the flight deck.  To correctly use the flight deck 
biometric authentication system, it needs to be readily accessible by the pilot and co-
pilot.  Current controls and displays in the flight deck are in easy reach of both the pilot 
and co-pilot.  As mentioned in [12], all equipment should be operable from the normal 
pilot’s station without removal of the safety belt or other equipment. 
Since the biometric system is intended to provide continuous authentication, it 
should be in a convenient place.  This convenience should not weaken security in the 
sense that a potential attacker or terrorist may be able to use or disable the device.  Since 
it is not possible to conceal the location of the biometric device onboard the aircraft, there 
should be strong physical security. 
Complex manual and automated systems impose demands on the pilot that are 
difficult to envision and understand [12].  The integration of a flight deck biometric 
authentication system should not introduce new problems that would prevent the pilot or 
co-pilot from using the device.  The pilot and co-pilot have many duties that they need to 
take care of prior to flight, during flight, and after the flight so the biometric 
authentication system that is integrated in the flight deck should not demand difficult or 
impossible tasks from the pilot or co-pilot.   
The biometric system should be tested in a realistic setting prior to deployment. If 
the biometric authentication system is tested in a realistic setting, such as in a place that 
resembles an actual flight deck, then we will get an idea as to how the system will 
perform in that setting.  Testing the authentication system in this setting will allow the 
integrators alleviate the problems that may exist in the flight deck prior to actual 
implementation. 
The lighting conditions in the flight deck do not stay uniform throughout a flight 
segment. All controls should be easy to locate and read under all ambient lighting 
conditions in the flight deck [12].  The same is true for the integrated biometric system.  
The pilot or co-pilot should be able to accurately use the system under any type of 
lighting conditions.  Some methods of biometrics are sensitive to lighting conditions (i.e. 
retinal scanning), so this must be taken into consideration in selecting a biometric 
authentication system.  
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2.  Guidelines for Checklist Design and Usage 
 
A good guideline is needed for the design and use of checklists.  The flight crew 
depends on these checklists and procedures in order to correctly report preparedness and 
readiness prior, during, and after a flight segment.  I will present only those guidelines for 
checklist design and usage that pertain to designing and using a checklist for the flight 
deck biometric authentication system.  The following guidelines only represent a subset 
of the guidelines introduced in [12].   
· Checklist responses should portray the desired status or the value of the 
item being considered not just “checked” or “set”.  This is true for the 
biometric system because we don’t want to know if the system is just 
powered on; we at least want to know if the system is working correctly 
and is ready to do its designated job.  This is especially true for the secure 
channel check to ensure the data that is transmitted to its designated source 
for template comparison.  It must be ensured that the secure channel is up 
and ready.   
· The use of hands and fingers to touch, or point to, appropriate controls, 
switches, and displays while conducting the checklist is recommended.  
This may be done with a quick test done by the appropriate personnel (i.e. 
a quick touch of the fingerprint scanner or a quick sound of the voice over 
a voice scanning device).   
· Sequencing of checklist items should follow the “geographical” 
organization of the items in the flight deck, and be performed in a logical 
flow.  Somewhere in the existing checklist there will be an entry that 
pertains to the biometric system. This entry should depend on where the 
biometric system is placed in the flight deck (e.g. there may be a voice 
authentication device at or around the microphone area and a thumbprint 
reader by the seat of the pilot).   
· Checklists should be designed so that their execution will not be tightly 
coupled with other tasks.  As with any other task done prior, during, and 
81 
after a flight, the biometric system checklist should have equal 
importantance.  It would be up to the discretion of the implementers of the 
biometric system checklist to ensure that this task does not interrupt 
existing tasks at hand.   
 
This small set of guidelines provides a starting point for designing a checklist for 
the flight deck biometric authentication system.   
 
3.  Policies and Procedures 
 
In general, policies are broad specifications of the manner in which management 
expects things to be done.  In the airline industry this concept applies to training, flying, 
and maintenance.  Policies would have to be defined for training of the flight crew to 
correctly use the flight deck biometric authentication system, using the biometric system 
while in flight, and maintenance.  Procedures for the biometric authentication system 
onboard the aircraft should be designed to be as consistent as possible with the policies 
already defined for the flight deck.  Furthermore, there shouldn’t be a procedure that 
would limit the biometric authentication to one flight crewmember because there may be 
a policy defined for the dynamic use of that biometric system.  The procedures and 
policies should not contradict each other and should be defined in parallel (if possible).    
Procedures exist in order to specify, unambiguously, six things [10]: 
· What the task is.  In terms of the flight deck biometric authentication 
system, this may simply explain what initially needs to be done with the 
system to prepare it for usage or what the steps to take would be if an 
error message were to appear on the screen.   
· When the task is conducted.  Initial startup for the biometric system must 
be done prior to flight and authentication must be done during flight, for 
example.   
· Defining who conducts the task.  It is possible that the main pilot is 
responsible for some of the tasks associated with the biometric system 
and the co-pilot may be responsible for a separate task regarding the same 
82 
biometric system.  This is where communication between the pilot and 
co-pilot is crucial. 
· How the task is done.  Specifying exactly what needs to be done will 
eliminate confusion or simple human error.  For example, there may be a 
document that explains how to bring up a certain application in the 
biometric system that may be needed during flight.   
· What the sequence of actions consists of.  This may apply to a specific 
biometric device (e.g. if there was a fingerprint scanning device in the 
flight deck, then there may be a refresher set of instructions on how to use 
the device). 
· What type of feedback is provided.  This may apply to the acceptance or 
rejection of the user when they are using the biometric device or system 
(e.g. an accepted message relayed back to the user).   
Introducing any new technology, a biometric system in this case, into the flight 
deck or any other domain requires the procedure designer to [12]: 
· Reevaluate all of the existing concepts and policies in light of the new 
technology 
· Support the new technology via new procedures 
The integration of a biometric authentication device onboard the aircraft is a big 
change and quick adaptation is the desired outcome.  The procedure designer, in this 
case, would need to reevaluate all of the existing concepts and policies in light of the new 
biometric authentication system and support this system by implementing a new set of 
procedures. This change needs to have a clear definition for everyone involved to 
understand, especially the procedure designer. Manuals, documents, checklists, and many 
other paper forms are already used in the flight deck.  Along with the existing documents 
there will be documents, manuals, and checklists that pertain to the flight deck biometric 
authentication system.  All of these related documents and paper forms must be kept in 
convenient, easy to locate areas.  Fast retrieval of these important documents must be 
possible in the event of a system breakdown or abnormalities with the system.  
Since the biometric system would apply to all of the authorized aircraft personnel, 
it is important to be able to maintain coordination and communication within the flight 
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crew and with any relevant external agents.  Coordination and communication applies to 
any action from start-up of the system to its shutdown (if applicable) and any other action 
in-between.   
Procedures should be clear and explicit, not too vague.  Vagueness violates one of 
the most important by-products of flight deck procedures: coordination of tasks between 
agents [10].  If the procedures for the biometric system are straightforward and 
comprehensible then there should be no problems in following them.  Moreover, the 
biometric system’s procedures should not yield different outcomes for the same task (e.g. 
when the biometric system task list calls for starting up the system, only one outcome 
will come about, the system will be powered up).   
Policies help to guide users into a frame of mind that will aid them in 
distinguishing between right and wrong in terms of what management wants them to do.  
For example, a college computer laboratory may have policies set in place that prohibit 
the downloading of music while users are logged into their systems (in the lab or through 
dial-up).  Management or, in this case, the school’s system administrator may view these 
policies differently than students.  Similarly different interpretations of policy may be 
held by different members of the airline industry.  Policies should take into account the 
operation and security of the biometric system and the security of the documents 
associated with the biometric system.  Setting final policies in regard to the biometric 
system employed in the flight deck is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
D.  SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR FLIGHT DECK BIOMETRICS  
 
In order to implement biometrics in the flight deck, one must take into 
consideration the security requirements that such a system should or must meet prior to 
implementation.  If security policies are put in place and are abided to by the users, then 
the system is less vulnerable to many known attacks or the degrading of services or 
systems.  This  
At the enrollment facilities, it should be a part of the security policy to physically 
check the identification of users who are attempting to enroll (i.e. having two forms of 
identification as a requirement, for example).  By having this physical checking of 
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identification, we are reducing the chances of an unauthorized person enrolling into the 
system.  We will know who is enrolling their biometric data into the system with high 
assurance.  The actual enrollment room, where the biometric device resides, should be 
physically secure as well.  Physical security of this area is possible by inserting padlocks 
or cipher locks on the doors in order to control access.  As users complete their 
enrollment process, the authorized person, who is in charge of overseeing the whole 
process, should also keep pen and paper logs of who has enrolled into the system for a 
given day, if possible.  These pen and paper logs can be compared to an electronic 
counting device, which can be used to keep a numerical value of how many users have 
enrolled for a given day, this can be used for added security.     
Since the enrollment facilities are responsible for communicating all information 
to the matching facilities, this communication is secure.  If the enrollment facilities are 
responsible for providing trusted DVDs to the matching facilities and the trusted PC 
onboard the aircraft, then this must also be done in a highly secure manner.  If the 
biometric template database is saved onto a DVD, as in Design #2, these DVDs must be 
of high integrity to begin with.  Since the biometric template database may change often 
(i.e. additions, deletions), it is important that the updated information be put on DVDs 
and distributed to the appropriate locations in a timely manner.   
The matching facilities have the same responsibilities in both of the design 
proposals. One difference is in Design #1, where the matching facilities have to relay a 
message back to the flight deck.  This message is basically the outcome given from the 
biometric device (i.e. acceptance or rejection).  The distributed matching facilities will 
each have a copy of the biometric template database.  This information must be protected 
and should not be vulnerable to known attacks.  If the biometric template database is on 
DVDs, those DVDs need to be kept in a secure place so they are not liable to theft or 
manipulation.  The DVDs can also be encrypted to prevent manipulation or extraction of 
information (the movie industry supports this to prevent movie piracy).   
The biometric device(s) should be protected from tampering and theft.  These 
device(s) in the flight deck should only be accessed and used by authorized personnel.  
The biometric device(s) used at the enrollment facilities should also be protected from 
tampering and theft.  These devices at the enrollment facilities can be physically secured, 
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in a separate room, along with the other devices used for enrollment purposes.  One way 
in which the biometric device(s) can be secured in the flight deck is to provide an access 
control mechanism into the flight deck (i.e. implementing a biometric device outside of 
the flight deck region such that only authorized personnel are allowed into this area).  
Another way that the biometric device(s) can be secured in the flight deck is to provide 
the location of the device(s) on a need to know basis.  For example, passengers do not 
need to know where the devices are stored and used, but the co-pilot or flight attendant 
has to know where these devices are. The use of a biometric device or system of devices 
in the flight deck can be done very discretely, with no effect on any other persons 
onboard.   
Strengthening the security policies for the biometric system will aid in protecting 
the system throughout its lifetime and use.  Education pertaining to the security policies 
for the users of the system is necessary so that they fully understand and abide by them.  
Training eliminates simple mistakes by the user and can be done either during enrollment 
or separately, depending on how the system is set up and whether a single biometric or 
several biometric methods will be used.  Training can be analogous to the training that 
the pilots received in order to carry a gun onboard the aircraft, but not as intensive.   
 
E.  ANCILLARY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1.  Biometric Template Size and Processing Time  
 
Depending on how many templates need to be stored in this database, the 
template size of various biometrics may become an issue.  Some approximate biometric 
template sizes are [30]: 
 
· Voice   70 – 80Bytes/second 
· Face   84 – 2000 B 
· Fingerprint  256 B – 1200 B 
· Hand Geometry 9B 
· Iris   256 B – 512 B 
· Retina   96B 
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Template sizes vary for every biometric method.  If a biometric method is chosen 
with a higher approximate template size, then it may be possible to store these templates 
in a compressed form within its storage device.  If the biometric templates are stored in a 
trusted DVD, as proposed in Design #2, then compression may not be needed since 
DVDs can hold 4.7 GB of data on each side (if the DVD is double sided).   
The processing time needed to perform matching of a live template to a stored 
template and from when the user enrolls his/her biometric to the time that the enrolled 
biometric is converted into its numerical equivalent needs to be as close to real time as 
possible.  Processing speed for computer systems continues to grow rapidly so it should 
not be a problem in choosing an appropriate system for this purpose.  Lastly, clear and 
concise templates are necessary for storage and accurate matching later on in the process.   
 
2.  Enrollment Facilities System 
 
The system for the enrollment facilities has to be physically secured.  This system 
should possess the capability that would allow an authorized user to add and delete 
templates as needed.  Deleted templates need to be taken off the system permanently and 
there should be a mechanism available to validate that this has been done correctly.  The 
system should not allow the recovery of deleted items (i.e. templates) and the accuracy of 
data collection is a must. 
A system security policy needs to be set in place that covers audit trail 
information, quality control, system management, and assurance level.  Audit trail 
information should include the time of the event, event type, and the outcome of the 
event (i.e. rejection or acceptance of the user into the system).  System management may 
include the enforcement of security policies.  The assurance level of the system should be 
high at all times and the integrity of the system should not be, or become, vulnerable to 
attack.  If this system is vulnerable to attack, a lot of vital information can be 
compromised.  This vital information could be the actual biometric templates that are 
stored in the system or the password to get into the system.   
Backups are an important aspect of system administration and should be equally 
important for the biometric authentication system as well.  A good backup system will 
always be useful in the event of a system breakdown.  If backups are created regularly, 
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they will contain the most up to date information.  Not only do we need backups of 
biometric templates, we also need a backup of the entire system in the event that 
something happens to the main biometric authentication system.  For example, if the 
main system crashes or freezes, there would be no way to be able to recover the lost data 
without having an adequate backup system.  Furthermore, if the system is in an unstable 
state when it freezes up then there may be some loss of data; this is where the backup 
system comes in handy since it contains the same information as the main system does.  
The level of redundancy and fault tolerance needed is out of the scope of this study. 
 
3.  Trusted PC Onboard the Aircraft 
 
The trusted PC onboard the aircraft should be non-bypassable, tamperproof, and 
physically secure.  The onboard PCs main responsibility is the matching of live templates 
against stored templates and either accepting or rejecting the user based on his or her 
score in relation to the initial threshold.  There should not be a delete/add users 
mechanism on this particular PC because it is only used for matching purposes and 
providing outcome to the users or situation assessment personnel.   
Just like the PC used at the enrollment site, this PC should also have a system 
security policy, which would cover the same aspects and ideas as the enrollment site PCs.    
The onboard biometric system, including the trusted matching device is a stand-alone 




Based upon technical considerations and high- level requirements two designs 
have been proposed for continuous in-flight authentication of personnel on the flight 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As evidenced by recent world events, there is a need to increase security onboard 
commercial aircraft.  Many current measures seek security fortifications outside of the 
flight deck.  For example, our airports contain many more security screeners and many 
other security provisions have been set in place, including the arming of some pilots in 
the flight deck.  Positive identification of personnel in the flight deck is needed.  By using 
biometrics in the flight deck, we can solve the authentication problem in the flight deck 
and for this; two designs are presented. 
 Many biometric methods are introduced in this study, from fingerprint to facial 
recognition, but there are many newer biometric methods that have not been included due 
to lack of sufficient data regarding their effectiveness.  As single biometric devices may 
suffice for authentication in the flight deck, so might the use of multi-biometrics improve 
an authentication system in the flight deck.  More studies in multi-biometrics are needed 
in order for the effectiveness to be understood.  
 How can we implement a secure biometric authentication system onboard an 
aircraft?  Proposed Designs #1 and #2 serve to answer this question.  Proposed Design #1 
takes advantage of the idea of secured communication channels, where biometric 
templates must travel back and forth from the flight deck to the matching facilities 
whereas proposed Design #2 eliminates the need for secured communication channels 
external to the aircraft.  Proposed Design #2 takes advantage of the idea of mass storage 
(i.e. the database full of authorized user’s templates) stored on reasonably small media 
(i.e. DVDs) and having a trusted PC onboard the aircraft.   
Prior to choosing an adequate biometric method, one needs to carefully research 
biometric performance measurements.  These measurements are important when we are 
balancing security and convenience.  Biometric vulnerabilities are defined so that they 
can be mitigated before clever attackers use them.  This document serves to introduce and 
define security considerations for the use of biometric authentication in the flight deck.  
A means of protecting data by providing procedures that allow you to automatically 
recover from hardware failures (fault tolerance) in terms of critical user data (their 
biometric information) and system reliability are topics for future research.   
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Further research for use of biometric systems in the flight deck should be done in 
the area of multi-biometrics.  If additional research and testing (on combining different 
biometric methods together) is done in this area, we would then have sufficient 
information that would be useful in choosing the best biometric methods to combine 
together to form a strong system overall.  
This thesis has examined the problem of authentication in the flight deck.  Several 
biometric techniques were reviewed, flight deck requirements were given, and two 
designs were developed and discussed.  Expansion of the designs proposed herein is 
possible to accommodate advances in the area biometric technology and biometric 
authentication systems.  Future developments in biometric technology should make one 
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